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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the nascent spectrum of legal expertise known as "computer 
law," few segments have grown more rapidly over the past decade 
than software protection. And in the realm of intellectual property 
law, no subject matter has generated more interest during that period 
than software. Indeed, at the intersection of these two areas of law, 
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interest has mushroomed, as evidenced by a sharp increase in demand 
for counseling on how best to protect software, and by the crescendo 
of litigation directed toward its protection. 
Before one can make knowledgeable choices among the various 
mechanisms and techniques available for protecting software,l it is de­
sirable to inquire into the inherent nature of software and its develop­
ment, its traditional sources, and the legal and extra-legal methods 
available for its protection. Perhaps the best place to begin is by defin­
ing the subject matter. 2 
"Software" is a term used somewhat differently by various au­
thors, but which generally comprises three classes of subject matter: 
computer programs ("programs"); data bases; and documentation. 
For present purposes, a program can be regarded as a series of instruc­
tions in machine-readable form, prepared to achieve a certain result. 
A program, therefore, is the intelligence communicated to the com­
puter by the human in the latter's attempt to get the machine to do his 
or her bidding. A data base is a machine-readable representation of 
information. It may be an employer's list of employees arranged al­
phabetically, a firm's list of customers arranged by zip code, etc. It is 
entered into the computer, which then operates upon it. Documenta­
tion refers to all documents (generally human-readable) which explain 
the operation of other software or of computer hardware. For exam­
ple, documentation might discuss the methods used by a particular 
program to achieve its result, or might describe how to use the 
program. 
This article shall concentrate on the program, although parts will 
apply to data bases. Documentation is generally considered ancillary 
to some other entity (e.g., a program) and is rarely treated separately. 
II. UNUSUAL ASPECTS OF THE COMPUTER PROGRAM 
What is so "special," technically, commercially, or legally, about 
programs that they merit such attention? . 
In some respects program protection may be treated as an in­
stance of process protection. In other respects, however, the program 
is unusual, if not unique. One important reason why programs may be 
"special" is their ubiquity.3 Now involved far beyond the computer 
room, they are with us from the electronic switches of our telephone 
1. For a detailed explanation of software protection, see I D. BENDER, COMPUTER 
LAW: SoFTWARE PROTECfION, §§ 3.01, 3.02, 3A.01-.07, 4.01-.09, 4A.OI-.03 (1984). 
2. See generally id. §§ 1.05, 2.06. 
3. By the end of 1982, there were more computers than people. Lowell, Digits to the 
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system to the carburetors of our automobiles. Even when we travel 
into space we cannot escape them - indeed, we cannot so travel with­
out them. 
Technologically, the program is quite unusual in that it may as­
sume a number of different forms, which makes it confusing to under­
stand. Commercially, programs are unusual in that some people, even 
those technologically "savvy" in other areas, often do not appreciate 
the value of programs. In the early days of the computer industry vast 
numbers of valuable programs were made available to users, free of 
charge. While few still give their programs away, many still do not 
fully realize the value of programs. Perhaps this failure to recognize, 
or accord full value to, this distinct corporate asset is attributable to 
the mystique which sometimes surrounds the computer. If so, it will 
doubtless dissipate along with that mystique. 
Another reason why the program is arguably "special" is that it 
has already achieved enormous value, and is probably by far the fastest 
growing major type of technical subject matter. Total investment in 
software in the U.S. exceeds $200 billion,4 and the industry is in its 
infancy. 
Legally, programs are quite unusual because they are surrounded 
by uncertainty with regard to each branch of law which may arguably 
be used to protect them. 
III. THE NATURE OF A COMPUTER PROGRAM 
A program can exist in a number of different forms, and recogni­
tion of this fact is necessary to effect any successful protection effort. 
Doorstep, 1 PROTO 2 (1983). An estimated one million programs a year are created. Cas· 
tillo, Bill Safeguards Data Programs, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1980, at 01, col. 2. 
4. Reiling and Lester, Marketing Software Products, 8 AM. PAT. L.Q.J. 294 (1980). 
In 1974, less than 10% of our data processing costs went to software. Today, the figure is 
50%, and by 1990 it is predicted to rise to 80%. McClellan, End of the Hardware Era, 
Datamation, May I, 1984, at 122. 
In 1981, mo_re than $8 billion in software was marketed. ADAPSO, SIXTEENTH AN­
NUAL SURVEY OF THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY 53 (1982). In 1983, $2.1 billion in program 
products were marketed, with an estimate of $12 billion by 1988. Parceling out the 
Software, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1983, at 01, co1.2. Those figures do not include the gigan­
tic sums of money spent by companies to create and maintain software for their own use. 
Users of mainframe computers spent $5.6 billion for software in 1978, and $8.4 billion 
in 1980. Missing Computer Software, Bus. Week, Sept. I, 1980, at 46 (estimate of Int'l Data 
Corp.). Total software costs for 1990 have been estimated at $25 billion. Rush of New 
Companies to Mass-Produce Software, Bus. Week, Sept. I, 1980, at 54. According to the 
Government Accounting Office (GAO), by 1985, 90% of the federal government's comput· 
ing costs will be for software. Missing Computer Software, Bus. Week, Sept. I, 1980, at 46. 
In 1980, 80% of the Air Force's computing budget was for software (up from 20% in 
1970). Id. 
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The program germinates in the minds of the persons who desire and/ 
or create it. The first precursor of a program is a vision of some vague 
creature needed to fulfill a specific function. This is the "require­
ments" or "problem definition" or "specification" stage. 
In the minds and hands of its designers, it takes a more definite 
form. The entity is broken into parts (modules), each of which is fur­
ther subdivided. The nature, relationship, and interfaces of these parts 
. are determined: This is the "architecture" stage. 
The specific methods for solving the problem are fashioned. This 
is the "logic" or "algorithm" stage.s This may involve a "flowchart," 
wherein the program's logic is depicted graphically by a sequence of 
oddly shaped boxes connected by lines and arrows, meant to show the 
various processing steps and flow of data. The flowchart is effectively 
the program's blueprint. 
The program is then coded (the "coding" stage), resulting in a 
sequence of instructions in a rigidly defined language which typically 
has a vague resemblance to simple English. This is the "source pro­
gram" and, while comprehensible to the programmer, it is not directly 
intelligible to the computer. Accordingly, the source program is trans­
lated into an "object program," a sequence of "bits" (zeroes and ones) 
which the computer understands (but which is not easily intelligible to 
the programmer). As the program is coded, much time will be spent 
testing it, to exorcise as many of the inevitable programming errors as 
possible (de-bugging). Finally, the persons who have designed and 
created the program create the documentation describing it. 
In either source or object form, the program can be represented 
on various media. It can be handwritten on coding sheets (generally 
not machine-readable), or embodied on cardboard cards in the form of 
small rectangular punched holes or on tape in the form of magnetic 
impulses, etc. The machine-readable embodiment of the program (the 
deck of punched cards) is a "programming device," and is sometimes 
loosely called "the program." But in a more fundamental sense, the 
program is the intangible set of instructions embodying the architec­
ture, logic, and testing, rather than any tangible embodiment. The set 
of source program instructions can be printed out in sequence, to form 
the "listing." 
5. An algorithm is a rigidly defined, step-by-step procedure for solving a particular 
problem in a finite number of steps. The algorithm yields a solution to the particular prob­
lem under all circumstances. 
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IV. SOURCES OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS 
There are a number of sources for programs. Perhaps the most 
obvious is the hardware vendor, and most (if not all) computers are 
sold with some programs included in the price.6 The programs most 
likely to be included are those generic to the hardware's operation, 
regardless of the specific task required by the user; these are called 
"system" or "control" programs. Beyond that, most manufacturers 
also offer "application" programs, which are directed to a particular 
function such as printing out a payroll, or updating an accounts re­
ceivable file. Today the manufacturer typically includes some pro­
grams in the price of the hardware, and licenses others for an 
additional fee. 7 
A second source of programs is the user's own company. The 
majority of programs in use are probably user-created. When an or­
ganization has a specific problem for solution by computer, its first 
impulse typically is to create the necessary program in-house. Billions 
of dollars worth of programs are so created annually; most are of im­
mediate use only to the organization creating them. 
A third way of obtaining a program is to commission a "software 
house" to create it. 8 Most software houses will provide, under con­
tract, "custom" software to the specifications of those desiring it.9 A 
fourth way to get programs is through user groups or software clear­
ing houses. 
A fifth, and increasingly important way of obtaining use of pro­
grams, is to secure rights in a "program package" (also called a pro­
6. For a discussion of various hardware vending agreements, see Gordon & Starr, 
Software Development Contracts and Consulting Arrangements: A Structure for Enforce­
ability and Practicality, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 487, 493-505 (1985). 
7. Ten years ago, "almost all" programs were supplied by the hardware manufactur­
ers (presumably this excludes user-created programs). Today, independent software houses 
account for one third of the $14 billion dollar annual market, predicted to rise to a half by 
1988. McClellan, supra note 4, at 122. 
Some estimate that IBM's 1980 revenues for separately licensed software exceeded $1 
billion. Missing Computer Software, supra note 4, at 46. IBM's 1984 revenues for sepa­
rately licensed software have been forecast to be 5 billion. Verity, Call Unbundling Sign of 
Future Software-Driven Industry, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Nov. 10, 1980, § II, at 13. 
8. Software houses are companies whose business is largely the creation, mainte­
nance, and modification of programs. One estimate places the number of software houses 
at 4,000 in 1984. McClellan, supra note 4, at 122. In 1980 there were over 8,000 software 
houses with over 30,000 customers. Rush of New Companies to Mass-Produce Software 
supra note 4, at 54. The "independent" (i.e., non-mainframe manufacturer) software com­
panies had 1980 revenues of $2 billion, and could top $8 billion in 1985. No Patents - But 
Still Protected, Bus. Week, Oct. 20, 1980, at 102. 
9. See Gordon & Starr, supra, note 6 at 493. 
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prietary program, program product, or canned program). Unlike 
hardware, software reproduction involves no bending of metal, or 
other labor-, space-, and material-intensive activity. As a result, once 
the program has been created, even if its creation cost over a million 
dollars, creating an additional copy (e.g., a duplicate magnetic tape 
embodying the program) costs less than a hundred dollars. A develop­
ing company could hope to market a program of widespread utility to 
numerous users. Each user would pay far less than the cost of creating 
the program, while the creating company, by marketing to many 
users, could hope to recoup far more than its cost. Accordingly, eve­
ryone might come out ahead. \0 
Some believe the program product did not begin to blossom until 
1969, when IBM announced it was "unbundling."ll In 1970, program 
package revenues were $25 million. 12 By 1972 there were some 60 
program products each of which had achieved lifetime fees of a million 
dollars.13 By 1977 their number had grown to 302,14 and by mid-1980 
their number increased to 432.15 Some programs have been marketed 
to over a thousand installations. 16 By 1979, program products had 
annual revenues well in excess of a billion dollars, with a predicted 
annual growth rate through 1985 of over 20% (twice as high as the 
computer hardware business). 17 
The program package has several possible advantages vis-a-vis a 
custom program: it can be operational much sooner; it should be 
10. A good program product is more than simply a program available for licensing. 
It must be extensively debugged, reasonably easy to use, and accompanied by adequate 
documentation. It must also have a reasonably long useful life (preferably at least five 
years), widespread utility, improvement potential, and the ability to compete well against 
alternative program products. Finally, it must be priced right. 
11. "Bundling" was the practice whereby computer manufacturers sold their hard­
ware and software together as a single unit. The user did not have to use the manufac­
turer's software, but he did have to pay for it. See McGee, Financial Tax Accounting for 
Computer Software, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 651, 652-53 (1985). 
12. Rush of New Companies to Mass-Produce Software, supra note 4 at 54. 
13. Million Dollar Software Grows, Computerworld, Feb. 21, 1973, at 25, (reporting 
on a study done by International Computer Programs, Inc); 
14. Software Winners' Ranks Swell, Computerworld, March 27, 1978, at 2. Two of 
these each accounted for over $50 million. Id. 
15. See Goetz, When IBM Unbundled, Computerworld, Jan. 7, 1980, at 35; Goetz, 
Software Packages: Best buy Today, Datamation, Dec. 1979, at 136; Bulkeley, Computer 
Makers Feel Key to Sales Edge Lies in Better Programming, Wall St. J. Sept. 29, 1980, at I, 
col. 6. By 1980 there was a program package with total revenues in excess of $100 million. 
Id. 
16. See A. RALSTON & E. REILLY, JR., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 
AND ENGINEERING 373 (2nd ed. 1983). 
17. The market for software products tripled between 1980 and 1984. Software and 
Services Updates, Datamation, Oct. 15, 1984, at 185. 
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much less expensive; and by eliminating much "re-inventing of the 
wheel," it makes a more economic use of what we are increasingly told 
is a scarce resource - programmers. IS Some possible disadvantages 
vis-a-vis a custom designed program are longer running time, in­
creased memory requirements, and the necessity for expensive and 
time-consuming alterations to adapt it to the user's situation. 
The manner in which the user generally acquires a right to use in 
a program package is by taking a license. The license may also be the 
mechanism for acquiring rights in custom-designed programs, but 
more frequently such programs will simply be sold, rather than li­
censed, to the user (such a sale, because of the attributes of programs, 
involves its own intricacies). 19 Further, licensing is one mechanism by 
which users acquire rights in manufacturer-created software. As a re­
sult of all this, licensing is by far the most important vehicle for ac­
quiring rights in software created by another. 
V. LEGAL METHODS FOR PROTECTING SOFTWARE 
As a form of intellectual property, software is arguably protect­
able under patent law, copyright law, and/or trade secret law. As to 
patents, uncertainty exists with respect to applicability to most pro-· 
grams, although it is now clear that certain programmable processes 
and programmed machines are appropriate for patent protection. As 
to copyrights, there appears to be extensive applicability, but uncer­
tainty exists with respect to the scope of protection. And while classi­
cal trade secret law clearly applies to programs, there is a question as 
to whether that venerable corpus of law still exists in its traditional 
form. 
A. Patent Protection ofPrograms 
1. Nature of Patent Grant 
A United States patent grants to its owner the right to exclude 
others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention in the 
United States for seventeen years.20 It does not, however, confer on 
18. As of 1980, although there were some 543,000 programmers and systems ana­
lysts in the United States the average Fortune 1000 company was estimated to have two 
years of programming waiting to be done. Bulkeley, supra note 15, at 1. 
19. See Gordon & Starr supra, note 6, at 493. 
20. Patent protection is granted in 35 U.S.C. § 154 which states in pertinent part: 
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the paten­
tee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years. . . the right to exclude 
others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States.... 
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the owner the exclusive right to practice that invention, because one or 
more other patents may also cover the invention. So, for example, if a 
patent for a carburetor co-existed with a patent for a dual-barrelled 
carburetor, the owner of the latter could not lawfully manufacture his 
invention without a license from the owner of the former. However, 
seventeen years after a patent issues, the owner loses all right to 
exclude. 
2. Obtaining a U.S. Patent 
One seeks a patent by filing and prosecuting a patent application 
with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). The application 
should "contain a written description of the invention, and the manner 
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled"21 in the appropriate tech­
nology to make and use it; a statement of the best mode contemplated 
by the inventor; and one or more claims pointing out the subject mat­
ter regarded as the invention.22 These claims specifically delineate the 
metes and bounds of the invention, much as a deed sets forth the 
boundaries of real estate. 
The preparation and prosecution of a patent application is a tech­
nical and detailed task. An application can be filed and prosecuted 
only by the inventor or by a registered patent attorney or patent agent. 
Each year roughly 100,000 patent applications are filed and some 
70,000 patents issue.23 The average time between filing of the applica­
tion and issue of the patent is currently between 2 and 2 1/2 years.24 
3. Requirements for a U.S. Patent 
There are many requirements which must be satisfied for a valid 
U.S. patent to issue. First, there is a strict standard of nove1ty.2S Be­
yond this, there is a requirement that the invention not be "obvious" 
to one skilled in the appropriate area of technology.26 While these 
Id. 
21. Id. § 112. 
22. Id. 
23. D. WALLACHINSKY & I. WALLACE, THE PEOPLE'S ALMANAC 82 (1975). 
" 'Every man, woman, and child is a potential inventor,' says Isaac Fleischman, longtime 
public information officer for the U.S. Patent Office, 'and 90% of them have tried to invent 
something. . . .''' Id. "[O]ver 100,000 patent applications are filed each year, and in 1973 
54,960 U.S. Citizens were granted patents, which is one patent per 3,790 persons." Id. 
24. Id. at 83. 
25. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). 
26. Id § 103. 
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requirements are generic and not limited to program-related inven­
tions, they will preclude patents on most programs. 
4. Statutory Subject Matter 
a. What Types of Inventions can be Patented? 
A patent may be obtained on any useful, new and non-obvious 
"process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof."27 Most (but not all) of the litiga­
tion, as well as writing, on whether programs are protectable by patent 
has been on this "subject matter" issue. Specifically, the question 
posed has been whether or not the claimed invention constitutes a 
programmable "process" or programmed "machine," as those terms 
are used in patent law. Basically, this has been reduced to the question 
of whether the invention is a mathematical algorithm (non-statutory) 
on the one hand, or a non-mathematical algorithm, or the application 
of an algorithm (statutory), on the other. 
b. U.S. Supreme Court Cases 
The subject matter issue has been considered on four occasions by 
the United States Supreme Court. In Gottschalk v. Benson,28 the 
Court held claims non-statutory for wholly pre-empting an "al­
gorithm."29 The question left by the ambiguous language of that deci­
sion was whether a claim was rendered non-statutory for preemption 
of any algorithm, or rather solely for preemption of a mathematical 
algorithm. 
In Parker v. Flook,30 the court stated that any mathematical al­
gorithm in the claim must be treated as well-known, and if no novelty 
remains, the claim is not patentable.31 The court also asserted that a 
claim directed to an improved method of calculation using a formula, 
even if the solution to a particular end use, is non-statutory.32 A vig­
orous three-judge dissent accused the majority of confusing the subject 
matter standard with the novelty standard. 33 
In Diamond v. Diehr,34 a five to four majority decided a number 
of important points. First, they held that in determining whether a 
27. Id. § 101. 
28. 409 u.S. 63 (1972). 
29. Id. at 71-72. 
30. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
31. Id. at 592-94. 
32. Id. at 594-95. 
33. Id. at 600. 
34. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
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claim is statutory, "claim dissection" into old and new portions is im­
proper; the claim must be analyzed as a whole, rather than at the 
"point of novelty" as the PTO had been inclined to do. 3s Accordingly, 
the Court divorced section 10136 subject matter considerations from 
section 10237 novelty considerations. In addition, the Court inter­
preted Benson's use of the term "algorithm."38 In Benson, the ques­
tion left undecided by ambiguous language was whether the court's 
ruling was limited to mathematical algorithms or was meant to extend 
to all algorithms. Diehr provided a clear answer: The Benson rule was 
limited to mathematical algorithms.39 Finally, the court specifically 
held that the statutory nature of a claim "is not altered by the fact that 
in several steps of the process a mathematical equation and a program­
med digital computer are used."40 
Diamond v. Bradley,41 which the Court affirmed four to four 
without opinion, also stands for the proposition that the mere fact that 
a computer is involved in the claim cannot negate the presence of stat­
utory subject matter.42 
c. PTO Guidelines 
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Diehr and Bradley, the 
PTO issued guidelines.43 The test embodied in these guidelines is to 
first determine whether a mathematical algorithm is directly or indi­
rectly recited in the claim, and if so, to ask if the claim merely recites a 
mathematical algorithm.44 If the answers to both questions are in the 
affirmative, the claim is non-statutory; otherwise it is statutory.4S 
d. Lower Court Cases 
In the wake of Diehr and Bradley, the CCP A decided several 
cases providing useful standards and applications. In In re Taner,46 
the court held that a claim reciting the "summing" of electrical signals 
35. Id. at 188-89. 
36. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). 
37. Id. § 102. 
38. 450 U.S. at 184-86. 
39. Id. at 186, n.9. 
40. Id. at 185. 
41. 450 U.S. 381 (1981). 
42. Id. 
43. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2110, Patentable Subject Matter: 
Mathematical Algorithms or Computer Programs (1981). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. 681 F.2d 787, 214 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 678 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
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- which the court characterized as a mathematical algorithm - was 
actually directed to a conversion of electrical signals, deemed to be a 
statutory process, even though the "physical apparitions" could be ex­
pressed in mathematical terms.47 
In re Pardo48 reiterated the two-step test to be used in determin­
ing whether program-related claims are statutory: (1) to determine 
whether a mathematical algorithm is directly or indirectly recited; and 
(2) if it is, to determine from analyzing the claim as a whole, whether 
the algorithm is applied in any manner to physical elements or process 
steps. If the answer to both questions is affirmative, the claim is statu­
tory.49 The court applied that test to the steps of examining, compil­
ing, storing, and executing formulas internally in a computer so as to 
convert it from a sequential processor to one whose functioning is not 
dependent on the order in which it receives instructions. The court 
ruled there was no mathematical algorithm directly or indirectly re­
cited in these steps. so 
In In re Abele,S! the court dealt with an algorithm conceded to be 
mathematical. The court held that one claim presenting no more than 
calculation and subsequent display of a number was non-statutory.S2 
However, another claim which required the input of data resulting 
from passing an X-ray through a CAT scanner was held statutory. 53 
The production, detection, and display steps were statutory, regardless 
of the presence of an algorithm, and it was in connection with them 
that the algorithm was applied. Accordingly, the rule embodied in 
Abele seems to be that if a mathematical algorithm is applied in any 
manner to physical elements or process steps, provided that the appli­
cation is circumscribed by more than a field of use limitation or non­
essential post-solution activity, the claim is statutory. 54 
In re Meyer S5 dealt with claims for analyzing the results of tests 
on a complex system. Although no mathematical formula was recited 
in the claims, the court held that the decisive factor was whether the 
method was essentially a mathematical calculation. S6 The purpose of 
47. Id. at 790-91, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 681-82. 
48. 684 F.2d 912, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citing In re WaIter, 618 
F.2d 758, 767, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 397, 407 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
49. Id. at 916, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 676. 
50. Id. at 916-17. 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 677. 
51. 684 F.2d 902, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 682 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
52. Id. at 908, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 687-88. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. 688 F.2d 789, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (Cust. Ct. 1982). 
56. Id. at 795-96, 215 U.S.P.Q. (DNA) at 198. 
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the invention was partially to replace, with a computer, the thought 
processes of a neurologist. The applicant acknowledged that the 
claims recited a mathematical algorithm. The court concluded the al­
gorithm had not been applied to physical elements or process steps 
and was, therefore, non-statutory. 57 
5. Infringement 
In the very earliest days of the computer industry, there was no 
such thing as a program. Computers were instructed through numer­
ous circuits made by connecting wires and jacks on large structures 
resembling telephone switchboards. This was extremely cumbersome 
and time-consuming, and was soon replaced by the stored computer 
program. Crucial to an understanding of programs, however, is the 
tenet that there is an equivalence between software (the program) and 
hardware (the wired circuit). For every program there exists an 
equivalent hardware circuit, and vice versa. 
Moreover, there is an entity which stands conceptually between 
hardware and software; aptly enough, it is called "firmware" or "read­
only memory" (ROM). ROM comprises part of the computer's mem­
ory, indelibly imprinted with a program. This is in contrast to the 
software situation, where programs are read into memory, which is 
then effectively erased seconds or minutes later, when the instant job is 
terminated and the computer is readied for the next. There is gener­
ally full functional equivalence among hardware, software, and 
firmware. 
This equivalence raises some interesting questions. First, can use 
of a programmed computer infringe a hardware patent? One court 
has answered that question in the negative58 while another has ruled 
that a "means plus function" apparatus claim, where hardware is dis­
closed, is infringed by a programmed digital computer. 59 Another in­
teresting - and thus far unanswered - question is whether, where a 
"program patent" issues, equivalent hardware may infringe it. 
57. Id. at 796, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 198-99. 
58. Digitronics Corp. v. New York Racing Ass'n, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 602,638-40 
(E.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 553 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977). The 
court held that "means plus function" claims (see 35 U.S.c. § 112 (1982» were not in­
fringed by a general purpose computer programmed to perform the same function as the 
claimed apparatus. Digitronics, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 640. 
59. Arshal v. United States, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 749 (Ct. Cl. 1979), affd on other 
grounds, 621 F.2d 421, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 397 (Ct. Cl. 1980). 
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6. Advantages and Disadvantages of Patent Protection 
The advantages of patent protection for software include the fol­
lowing: (1) patent protection is well suited to an invention which may 
enjoy great proliferation; (2) patents protect against independent in­
vention (one corollary is that in litigation, the plaintiff need not show 
copying); (3) the protective duration is seventeen years, relatively long 
in the program milieu; (4) once secured, patent protection may be 
maintained with relative ease60 and aids in licensing; and (5) because 
the owner has an exclusive right in the algorithm he or she may freely 
disclose how the program works - which may be an important mar­
. keting tool. 
Among the disadvantages of patent law in the software milieu are 
the following: (1) it is difficult to obtain preliminary relief in the event 
of litigation;61 (2) many types of programmable processes and 
programmed machines may ultimately be held to be non-statutory 
subject matter; (3) there is present commercial uncertainty arising 
from this fact, even if many types of programs should eventually be 
held patentable; (4) most valuable programs will not qualify for pat­
ents even if the subject matter is appropriate since they will run afoul 
of the novelty and non-obviousness requirements; (5) even if a pro­
gram may be patented, this may be possible only if it is claimed in an 
awkward and unnatural manner; (6) the cost of securing patent pro­
tection may be relatively high;62.(7) the interim between filing a patent 
application and issue of a patent typically exceeds two years,63 often a 
significant part of the program's lifetime; (8) patent protection is not 
applicable to data bases or documentation; (9) because the patent itself 
is a public document, it is difficult to police unlawful use; (10) patents 
may have a more restricted ambit of proper exploitation than alterna­
tive methods;64 (11) if the owner is party to an antitrust consent judg­
ment requiring him to license all patents, such patents are presumably 
included; and (12) aside from any problems unique to software, the 
60. But see 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1981) (requiring maintenance fees for patents). 
61. Some feel that the law may be about to change on this point. See Smith Int'l v. 
Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir.), em. denied, 104 S. Ct. 493 (1983). 
62. In the case of a patent which issued in 1980 on a sort process embodied in a 
popular program product, it was reported that the cost to prosecute the application was 
about $100,000. Rosenberg, Whitlow Sort Processes Patented, Computerworld, July 28, 
1980, at 55. 
63. Prosecution of the patent referenced in the immediately preceding note required 
some eight years. Id. 
64. The doctrine of patent misuse renders unenforceable a patent used in a manner 
deemed by a court to be contrary to public policy. Morton Salt Co. v. O.S. Suppieger Co., 
314 U.S. 488, 52 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 30 (1942). 
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entire U.S. patent system has problems manifested both in the PTO 
and the courtS.6S 
B. Copyright Protection ofSoftware 
Copyright protects an author's original expression or form, as op­
posed to idea or concept. It protects against copying but not against 
independent origination. The problems inherent in the application of 
copyright law to programs include whether programs constitute copy­
rightable subject matter, and if so, determining the scope of copyright 
protection. The Copyright Office long ago announced a policy favor­
ing copyrightability of programs.66 
1. Statutes 
The new Copyright Act, generally effective January 1, 1978,67 
contains section 102(a): 
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of ex­
pression, now known or later developed, from which they can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, whether di­
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device ....68 
The Act, as enacted in 1976, also contained section 117: 
Nothwithstanding the provisions of Sections lO6 through 116 
and 118, this title does not afford to the owner of copyright in a 
work any greater or lesser rights with respect to the use of the work 
in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, process­
ing, retrieving, or transferring information, or in conjunction with 
any similar device, machine, or process, than those afforded to 
works under the law, whether title 17 or the common law or stat­
65. Positive steps taken to rectify this problem include (a) creation in 1982 of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to which all patent infringement appeals 
now go. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(c)-1292(d), 1295 (1982), and (b) increased funding for the 
PTO. 
66. Library of Cong. Info. Bull. 226 (May 18, 1964). 
From 1976 through mid-1980, only 2,000 programs were registered with the Copy­
right office. No Patents-But Stil/ Protected, Bus. Week, Oct. 20, 1980, at 102. However, 
this was not indicative of the degree of reliance on copyright, as registration, although 
necessary for enforcement, may not be necessary for protection. In the past few years the 
number of registrations for programs has increased sharply. 
67. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982) (publ. L. No. 94-553 (Oct. 19, 1976». The legisla­
tive history is found at S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 56, 59; and H.R. Rep. 
No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5810. 
68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). 
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utes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable 
and construed by a court in an action brought under this title. 69 
A commission was created by Congress70 to study the problem of pro­
tecting programs. CONTU recommended legislation: 
The new copyright law should be amended: I) to make it ex­
plicit that computer programs, to the extent that they embody an 
author's original creation, are proper subject matter of copyright; 
2) to apply to all computer uses of copyrighted programs by the 
deletion of present Section 117; and 3) to ensure that rightful pos­
sessors of copies of computer programs may use or adapt these cop­
ies for their use.11 
The Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, embodying the 
CONTU recommendations, was enacted into law in December 1980.72 
It added a definition to section 101 of the Copyright Act: 
A "computer program" is a set of statements or instructions to 
be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a 
certain result.73 
It also replaced the original section 117: 
§ 117. Limitations on exclusive rights: computer programs. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an in­
fringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make 
or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that com­
puter program provided: 
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essen­
69. Id. § 117. 
70. NATIONAL CoMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF CoPYRIGHTED 
WORKS, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974) (hereinafter CONTU). For a discussion 
of the creation of CONTU, see generally Stem, Section 117 ofthe Copyright Act: Charter of 
the Software Users' Rights or an Illusive Promise?, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 459 (1985). 
71. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CoMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
USES OF CoPYRIGHTED WORKS, 1 (1978) (hereinafter CONTU REPORT). Commissioner 
John Hersey, the noted author of the CONTU REPORT, dissented vigorously on the basis 
of his conviction that a computer program is not a "writing" in the Constitutional sense: 
"The Congress shall have the power. . . To promote the Progress of Science [i.e., philoso­
phy] ... by securing for limited Times to authors ... the exclusive Right to their Writ­
ings...." U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 8. "The Act of 1976 should be amended to make it 
explicit that copyright protection does not extend to a computer program in the form in 
which it is capable of being used to control computer operations." CONTU REPORT at 37. 
72. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3028 (codified at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982». 
73. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). An extensive discussion of § 117 is found in Stem, supra 
note 70, at 459-85. 
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tial step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction 
with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or 
(2) that such a new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes 
only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that con­
tinued possession of the computer program should cease to be 
rightful. 
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of 
this section may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with 
the copy from which such copies were prepared, only as part of the 
lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program. Adapta­
tions so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of 
the copyright owner. 
One possible problem posed by the statute is whether it is Consti­
tutional. Some have suggested that defining a program as copyright­
able subject matter may run afoul of the Constitutional dichotomy74 
between the domains of the patent (excluding practice of the tangible 
embodiment of an idea) and of the copyright (protecting the copying 
of an expression).75 This argument traces its heritage back at least as 
far as Baker v. Selden,76 which held that where the use of copyrighted 
forms was necessary to practice an accounting method explained in a 
book containing the forms, it was not copyright infringement to so use 
the forms.77 Further, some read Selden to hold that if it is impossible 
to separate idea from expression, use of the expression cannot consti­
tute copyright infringement. The patent/copyright relationship was 
further explored in Mazer v. Stein,'8 wherein the court held that a 
particular statuette lamp base was copyrightable subject matter be­
cause its aesthetic qualities were separable from its utilitarian 
aspects.79 
More recently, the second circuit decided whether certain three 
dimensional artistic belt buckles were copyrightable under the old Act 
74. Indeed, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) provides: 
To no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to 
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless ofthe form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied in such work. 
75. See Commissioner John Hersey's dissent in the CONTU REPORT, supra note 71, 
at 27-37. 
76. 101 u.s. 99 (1879). 
77. Id. at 101-104. 
78. 347 U.S. 201, reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954). 
79. See id. at 214-19. But see Esquire Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1978), reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979) (copyright protection denied 
for the overall shape of a light fixture because the aesthetic element could not be severed 
from the utilitarian element). 
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and the new. 80 The trial court held that they were not because they 
"fail[ed] to satisfy the test of separability and independent existence of 
the artistic features, which is required under both statutes."81 On ap­
peal, the defendant argued the buckles were uncopyrightable as being 
"useful articles" without sculptural features that could be identified 
separately from, or were capable of existing independently of, the utili­
tarian aspects.82 Noting that separability may occur either physically 
or conceptually, the second circuit held the buckles copyrightable be­
cause the "primary ornamental aspect . . . is conceptually separable 
from the subsidiary utilitarian function."83 
Judge Weinstein dissented, asserting that the innovations of artis­
tic form were inseparable from the function84 and that the 1976 Act 
protects only those useful articles which can be identified separately 
from, and are capable of existing independently of, utilitarian as­
pects.85 He noted further that the "overall design or configuration of a 
utilitarian object, even if it is determined by aesthetic as well as func­
tional considerations, is not eligible for copyright."86 According to 
the dissent, the distinction is between "ornamental and superfluous de­
signs contained within useful objects" and "artistically designed func­
tional components of useful objects."87 Indeed, Judge Weinstein 
stated that in propounding the 1976 Act, Congress considered and re­
jected extending copyright protection to the design of a useful arti­
80. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 208 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 1 (2d Cir. 1980). 
81. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 732, 736, 206 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 439, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980). See 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (1982). 
82. Id. Both the old and new law deny copyrightability to such an article. See 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (1982). 
83. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993, 208 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1980). No claim was made that the buckles lacked originality or 
creativity, and the court stated that they "[rose] to the level of creative art." Id. at 994,208 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 2. 
84. Id. at 994, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 6 (Weinstein, J., dissenting)."It is the origina­
tor's success in completely integrating the artistic designs and the functional aspects of the 
buckles that preclude copyright." Id. 
85. Id. at 995, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 6 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). 
86. Id. at 996, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 7 (Weinstein, J., dissenting) (quoting Esquire, 
Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908, reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 
917 (1979». 
Indeed, one author suggests that as applied to artistic writings the idea/expression 
"dichotomy is at best difficult to apply and at worst wholly inapplicable. . . . copyright 
does protect some ideas." Note, Derivative Works and the Protection of Ideas, 14 GA. L. 
REV. 794, 812 (1980). 
87. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 996, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 7 (Weinstein, J., 
dissenting). 
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cle.88 Acknowledging the policy question of whether encouraging art 
is more important than permitting the less afHuent to enjoy such 
works, he left this question for Congress. 89 
2. Copyright Cases Relating to Software Protection 
Although the first such case was not decided until 1978, cases are 
now cascading through the lower courts. These cases suggest there 
may be no area in which it is more important for courts to grasp the 
fundamentals of computer technology than in the area of copyright 
protection for software. The first case dealing squarely with infringe­
ment of a copyright on a program is Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A 
Group.90 Defendant marketed a game including a ROM which em­
bodied plaintiff's program. Plaintiff had no copyright notice, except 
on all copies of the source program (used internally by plaintifi), for 
which copyright registration was secured a year after plaintiff began 
marketing the program.91 
Plaintiff sued for copyright infringement and sought a prelimi­
nary injunction. Defendant moved for summary judgment. 92 In both 
ROMs, the program was in object form. 93 The district court con­
cluded that "the 'source program' is a writing while the 'object pro­
gram' is a mechanical tool or machine part."94 The court determined 
that the applicable law was the old copyright law so that either the 
common law or the 1909 Act would control on the issue of whether a 
ROM was a copy.95 Further, the court held that under either stan­
dard the ROM was not a copy. "In its object phase, the ROM, the 
computer program is mechanical tool or a machine part but it is not a 
'copy' of the source program."96 
Finally, the court noted in dictum that if the 1976 Act did apply, 
copying a ROM would not constitute infringement because, while a 
ROM is a "copy" under that Act, that Act did not apply to programs 
88. Id. at 997, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 8 (Weinstien, J., dissenting). 
89. Id. at 999, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 9-10 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). In 1981 legis­
lation was introduced in the House to amend the Copyright Act so as to "provide for 
protection of ornamental designs of useful articles." H.R. 20, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 
90. 480 F. Supp. 1063, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 735 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd, 628 F.2d 
1038, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1971 (7th eir. 1980). 
91. Id. at 1065-66, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 738-39. 
92. Id. at 1065, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 738. 
93. Id. at 1066, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 738. 
94. Id. at 1065, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 738. 
95. Id. at 1067, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 740. 
96. Id. at 1066-67, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 741. 
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"in their object phase, i.e., ROM."97 
The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment, stating it was 
unnecessary to reach the issue of whether a ROM was a copy, and 
ruling that when it entered the public domain, the work lacked proper 
copyright notice so that under the applicable 1909 Act, copyright was 
forfeited. 98 While purporting not to consider whether under the 1909 
Act a ROM constituted a copy of the program embodied in it, the 
court - apparently without considering that issue and in the face of 
its statement that it need not reach it - implicitly decided in the af­
firmative.99 For in determining that pUblication occurred prior to 
1978, the court looked to section 26 of the 1909 Act, which defined 
"date of publication" as the earliest date when "copies" were placed 
on sale. 1OO 
A somewhat earlier case, also of interest for its reasoning, is 
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 101 which 
raised the question of whether a program could infringe a copyright on 
an input format form. 102 Defendant developed a program similar in 
function to plaintiffs, but which accepted its input in a different ar­
rangement. Because plaintiff had a significant market position, de­
fendant determined that defendant's marketing potential would 
increase if the input prepared by plaintiffs users for use with plaintiffs 
programs, could also be used with defendant's programs. 103 
Accordingly, defendant created a "preprocessor program" whose 
function was to take input designed for plaintiffs program, and to con­
97. Id. at 1066-67 n.4, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 739-740 n.4. Two reasons were 
stated: (1) "In its object phase, the computer program is a mechanical device which is 
engaged in the computer to become an essential part of the mechanical process," and 
"[m]echanical devices which cannot qualify as pictorial [or] graphic ... works are not 
writings and may not obtain copyright protection;" and (2) the Copyright Office's then 
proposed (and subsequently adopted) regulations on affixing notice contained language 
which seemed not to contemplate copyrightability of ROM's. Id. 
98. Id. at 1041, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 199. 
99. Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, 628 F.2d 1038, 1041,208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
197, 199 (7th Cir. 1980). 
100. Id. at 1042, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 200. 
101. 462 F. Supp. 1003, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537 (N.D. Tex. 1978). 
102. An "input format" is the arrangement of data to be input to the computer, so 
that the computer will recognize each item for what it is and for what its form is. As to 
each item there is a prescribed location (e.g., sixth location in the format), unit (e.g., me­
ters), and a particular manner of presentation (e.g., six digit decimal form with two digits to 
the right of the decimal point). Format is a concept that may be expressed by means of 
input format forms, which are specially prepared forms permitting insertion of input data 
in the proper arrangement and form. 
103. 462 F. Supp. at 1006, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 540. 
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vert it into the form of input for defendant's program. 104 Plaintiff con­
tended that defendant's preprocessor infringed the copyright on 
plaintiff's format form. "The [programming] statements in its 
preprocessor program are derived directly and precisely from the 
copyrighted manual card formats."lOs Looking to section 101 of the 
1909 Act,106 which granted to the copyright owner the exclusive right 
"to translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, or 
make any other version thereof,"lo7 plaintiff contended that the 
preprocessor infringed because it did "no more than translate the ex­
pression of the formats to a different computer language."lo8 
The court wrestled mightily with the question, asking if "se­
quencing and ordering is expression, what separable idea is ex­
pressed?" 109 The court concluded that the formats would be 
copyrightable if the ideas they expressed were separable from their ex­
pression; it ruled that they were not separable. I \0 
Plaintiff also apparently contended that defendant's preprocessor 
infringed the copyright in plaintiff's manual. I I I The court stated that 
translating the copyrighted program from one computer language to 
another would infringe, and that programming a copyrighted 
flowchart would probably infringe. But preparing a program from a 
general description of the problem would be quite dissimilar to trans­
lation of a literary work and would not infringe: 
In most cases, the formulation of the problem in sufficient de­
tail and with sufficient precision to enable it to be converted into an 
unambiguous set of computer instructions requires substantial im­
agination, creativity, independent thought, and exercise of discre­
tion, and the resulting program can in no way be said to be merely a 
copy or version of the problem statement. 112 
The most significant copyright software protection case to date 
may be Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,m which 
104. Id. at 1006-07, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 540-41. 
105. Id. at 1012, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 545. 
106. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1909) (amended 1976). 
107. Id. 
108. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1012, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 546. 
109. Id. at 1013, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 546. 
110. Id. 

Ill. Id. at 1004, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 538. 

112. Id. at 1013 n.5, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 546 n.S. 
113. 54S F. Supp. 812, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 935 (E.O. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 
1240, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 113 (3d Cir. 1983), cerro dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). This 
action was settled before the Supreme Court acted on defendant's petition for a writ of 
certiorari. See Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1984, at 10. 
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inquired into the patent/copyright dichotomy. Plaintiff alleged copy­
right infringement as to system programs embodied in ROMs and 
floppy disks. In denying plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunc­
tion, the district court was of the view that object code embodied in a 
silicon chip ROM1I4 might not be protectable by copyright as not con­
stituting a fixed expression of an original work. 1 IS 
The third circuit reversed. 116 Defendant did not dispute copying, 
and its factual defense was that it was not feasible for it to write its 
own operating system programs. 1l7 Defendant's principal legal de­
fense was that system programs were not susceptible to copyright 
protection.1IS 
The appellate court saw three issues" (1) whether copyright can 
exist in a program expressed in object code; (2) whether copyright can 
exist in a program embedded in ROM; and (3) whether copyright can 
exist in a system program.119 
On the first point, the third circuit found no statutory basis for 
distinguishing source code from object. 120 It also found that its own 
opinion in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artie International, Inc., 121 
dealt with many of the doubts expressed here by the district court.122 
The 1976 Act states two requirements for a work to constitute copy­
rightable subject matter: It must be (1) an "original work of author­
ship,"123 and (2) "fixed in a tangible medium of expression."124 
Section 102(a) enumerates seven types of "works of authorship," and 
the court found that the legislative history suggested that programs 
114. Presumably code embodied in a floppy disc would be similarly unprotectable. 
115. Franklin, 545 F. Supp. at 820, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 943-44. 
116. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 219 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 113 (3d Cir. 1983). 
117. Id. at 1245,219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 117. Defendant seemed to be saying it was 
not feasible for defendant to rewrite the system software so as to be compatible with plain­
tiff's application programs. The espoused reason was that there were too many "entry 
points" in relationship to the number of instructions in the program. Entry points are 
those locations in the system program which can be used to mesh the application programs 
with the system program. Defendant also alleged that "identical signals" were necessary to 
ensure 100% compatibility. The evidence was mixed on whether in fact the system pro­
grams could have been rewritten so as to be compatible. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 1246, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 118. 
120. Id. at 1247,219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 119. 
121. 685 F.2d 870, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 405 (3d Cir. 1982). 
122. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248, 219 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 113, 120 (3d Cir. 1983). 
123. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). 
124. Id. 
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were within the section 102(a) definition of literary works.12s 
The CONTU Report recommended that the law be amended to 
make it explicit that programs, to the extent they embody an author's 
original creation, are copyrightable. 126 The 1976 and 1980 versions of 
section 117 dealt only with the scope of protection. "The language of 
the [1980] provision, however, by carving out an exception to the nor­
mal proscriptions against copying, clearly indicates that programs are 
copyrightable and are otherwise afforded copyright protection."'27 
The third circuit noted that in Williams Electronics, it concluded 
that copyrightability of programs was established after the 1980 
amendment, and it had there rejected the argument there was a dis­
tinction between copyrightability of a source code program and of its 
object code form.12s 
The district court's suggestion that copyrightability depended on 
a communicative function to individuals emanated from the White­
Smith Music Co. v. Appollo Co.,l29 which held that a player piano roll 
was not a copy of a musical composition because it was not in a form 
people generally could perceive. The court suggested that the piano 
roll was not a copy because it was not intelligible to humans, but 
rather could be read only by a machine - a player piano. '30 But the 
appellate court found it clear from the language and the legislative 
history of the 1976 Act that it was intended to obliterate the White­
Smith distinction. 131 Moreover, the CONTU majority took the posi­
tion that object code was appropriate for copyright; 132 this, in the face 
of a dissent based on the theory that the machine control phase of a 
program is not directed to humans. 133 
Turning to the copyrightability of a program embedded in a 
ROM, the court found that issue also decided in Williams Electron­
ics. 134 Defendant there argued that copyright would not apply to a 
ROM because it was a utilitarian object or machine part. The Wil­
liams court held that "fixation" was satisfied through embodiment of 
125. [d. 685 F.2d at 875, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 409. 
126. CONTU REPORT, supra note 71, at 37. 
127. Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248, 219 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 113, 120 (3d Cir. 1983). 
128. Williams Elec., 685 F.2d at 876-77, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 409. 
129. 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
130. [d. at 18. 

13!. Williams Elec., 685 F.2d at 877 n.8, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 410 n.8. 

132. CONTU REPORT, supra note 71, at 38. 
133. [d. 
134. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249,219 
U.S.P.Q. (DNA) 113, 121 (3d Cir. 1983). 
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the expression in the ROM.13S Accordingly, the court reaffirmed that 
"a computer program in object code embedded in a ROM chip is an 
appropriate subject of copyright." 136 
The court next turned to what it viewed as defendant's main con­
tention: that system programs are excluded from copyright protection 
under 17 U.S.c. section 102(b), and under Selden. 137 Defendant made 
two arguments: (1) an operating system program is a process, system, 
or method of operation and, therefore, uncopyrightable;138 and (2) in 
the case of system software, idea merges with expression so that the 
former cannot be used without reproducing the latter; accordingly, 
copyright cannot bar such use. 139 
The court agreed with the defendant's contention that underlying 
section 102(b)140 and Selden is the distinction between property sub­
ject to the patent law, and property subject to the copyright law. 141 
But the court believed that defendant misapplied the distinction. In 
the court's view, the plaintiff sought to copyright not the method 
which instructs the computer to perform its oprating functions, but 
rather the instructions themselves. "Since it is only the instructions 
which are protected, a 'process' is no more involved because the in­
structions in an operating system program may be used to activate the 
operation of the computer that it would be if instructions were written 
in ordiQ.ary, English in a manual. ..."142 Moreover, the court saw 
defendant's contention as inconsistent with its concession that applica­
tion programs are appropiate for copyright protection. 143 
135. Williams Elee., 685 F.2d at 874, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 408. 
136. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249, 219 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120, 121 (3d Cir. 1983). 
137. Id. Defendant viewed Selden as standing for three propositions: (1) use of a 
system does not infringe a copyright on the description of the system; (2) copyright does 
not extend to purely utilitarian works; (3) copyright may not be used to monopolize an 
idea. Id. at 1250, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 121-22. 
138. Id. at 1250, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 122. 
139. Id. at 1253, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 124. 
140. For the text of § 102(b) see supra note 74. 
141. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1250, 219 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 113, 122 (3d Cir. 1983). 
142. Id. at 1250, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 122. 
143. Id. at 1251, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 123. 

Both types of programs instruct the computer to do something. Therefore, it 

should make no difference for purposes of section 102(b) whether these instruc­

tions tell the computer to help prepare an income tax return (the task of an appli­

cation program) or to translate a high level language program from source code 

into its binary language object code from (the task of an operating system 
program).... 
Id. 
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The court concluded the defendant's argument that: 
an operating system program is part of a machine mistakenly fo­
cuses on the physical characteristics of the instructions. But the 
medium is not the message ...." The mere fact that the operating 
system program may be etched on a ROM does not make the pro­
gram either a machine, part of a machine, or its equivalent. 144 
The court agreed with the CONTU majority that programs 
should no more be considered machine parts than videotapes should 
be considered parts of projectors. 145 
The defendant also contended operating systems could not be 
copyrighted because they are purely utilitarian, and the plaintiff 
sought to block use of the art embodied in its operating system. l46 
The court saw this argument as stemming from dictum in Selden: 
... where the art [taught by a book] cannot be used without em­
ploying the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or 
such as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be 
considered as necessary incidents to the art, given therewith to the 
public; not given for the purpose of publication in other works ex­
planatory of the art, but for the purpose of practical application. 147 
The court rejected what it saw as the expansive reading given this 
language by some other courtS. 148 Defendant's interpretation of this 
language precluded copyrightability where the work is put, to use. 
However, the court saw that interpretation as rejected in Mazer v. 
Stein :149 "We see nothing in the copyright statute to support the ar­
gument that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible 
for copyright bars or invalidates its registration."15o 
144. Id. 
145. Id. (quoting CONTU REPORT, supra note 71, at 21). 
146. Id. 
147. Selden, 101 U.S. at 103. 
148. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251, 219 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120, 123 (3d Cit. 1983). For an example of such expansive reading, see, 
e.g., Williams Elec., 685 F.2d at 877, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 409. 
149. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
150. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252, 219 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218). The Third 
Circuit noted that the CONTU majority agreed '!that the words of a program are used 
ultimately in the implementation of a process should in no way affect their copyright­
ability." Id. (quoting CONTU REPORT, supra note 71 at 21). ''The copyright status of the 
written rules for a game or a system for the operation ofa machine is unaffected by the fact 
that those rules direct the actions of those who play the game or carry out the process." Id. 
The court considered "the CONTU Report as accepted by Congress since Congress wrote 
into the law the majority's recommendations almost verbatim." Id. 
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The court noted that under Selden, as interpreted in Mazer, "a 
copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is 
given only to the expression of the idea - not the idea itself."lsl The 
dichotomy is embodied in section 102(b), which the legislative history 
indicates was intended "to make clear that the expression adopted by 
the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, 
and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are 
not within the scope of the copyright law."ls2 
Noting that courts have found difficulty in drawing the line be­
tween idea and expression, the court stated that in the case of an oper­
ating system, the line must be a pragmatic one balancing competition 
on the one hand, against protection on the other.ls3 
If other programs can be written or created which perfonn the 
same function as an Apple's operating system program, then that 
program is an expression of the idea and hence copyrightable. In 
essence, this inquiry is no different than that made to detennine 
whether the expression and idea have merged, which has been 
stated to have occurred where there are no or few other ways of 
expressing a particular idea. IS4 
Defendant claimed that whether or not the programs could be 
rewritten, there were a limited number of ways to arrange an operat­
ing system to enable a computer to run Apple-compatible application 
programs. According to the court this claim had no pertinence to the 
practice/expression dichotomy or to merger. 155 
The idea which may merge with the expression, thus making 
the copyright unavailable, is the idea which is the subject of the 
expression. . . . If other methods of expressing that idea are not 
foreclosed as a practical matter, then there is no merger. [Defend­
ant] may wish to achieve total compatibility with independently de­
veloped application programs written for the Apple II, but that is a 
commercial and competitive objective which does not enter into the 
somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and ex­
pression, have merged. IS6 
Another basis for the court's conclusion was that the statutory 
151. Id. (quoting Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217). 
152. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CoNG. 
& AD. NEWS 5659, 5670. 
153. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252, 219 
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definition of a computer program did not distinguish between applica­
tion and operating programs. The court noted that the district court 
in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc. IS7 found no dis­
tinction,IS8 and that Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc. IS9 
had upheld the copyrightabilty of an operating system without dis­
cussing the issue. l60 
Accordingly, the denial of the preliminary injunction was re­
versed161 and the case was remanded. 162 
The past four years have seen a cascade of cases involving pro­
gram copyright, with the vast majority espousing the propriety of pro­
tecting object code in ROM form.163 
157. 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). 
158. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252,219 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 780). 
159. 524 F. Supp. 171,214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 178 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
160. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252, 219 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173,214 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) at 179.) 
161. Id. at 1255, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 126. The appellate court also reversed the 
district court finding that plaintiff had not made the requisite showing for irreparable harm, 
because the lower court failed to recognize that "a copyright plaintiff who makes out a 
prima facie case of infringement is entitled to a preliminary injunction without a detailed 
showing of irreparable harm." Id. at 1254, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 125. Aside from that, 
the appellate court found substantial evidence of the considerable effort and investment by 
plaintiff in developing the programs in suit. Thus, even without the presumption of irrepa­
rable harm, plaintiff showed irreparable harm. Id. 
162. Id. at 1255, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 126. Because the record was unclear on 
whether some or all of the operating programs represented the only means of expressing the 
idea underlying them, the court stated that necessary findings could be made on remand. 
Id. at 1253, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 124. 
163. The following cases treat these and related issues. In some of them the copy­
right was on a videotape of a ROM-driven videogame. Stem Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 
F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'I, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 
(C.D. Cal.), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984); Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management 
Assistance, Corp., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. Idaho 1983); Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, 
Inc., 1984 CoPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 11 25,613 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. 
Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); S&H Computer Sys., Inc. v. SAS Inst., Inc., 
568 F. Supp. 416 (M.D. Tenn. 1983); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718 
(N.D. Cal. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D. N.J. 
1982); Nintendo of America v. Bay Coin Distributors, 1983 CoPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) 
1125,409 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. 
Ill. 1981), afJ'd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 90 (1983); Atari, Inc. v. 
North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1265 (N.D. Ill. 
1981), rev'd, 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cerro denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Williams Elecs., 
Inc. V. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Atari, Inc. V. Williams, 1983 Copy­
RIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 11 25,412 (E.D. Cal. 1981); Tandy Corp. V. Personal Micro Com­
puters, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Atari, Inc. v. Armenia, Ltd., 1981 
COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 11 25,328 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Atari, Inc. V. Amusement World, 
Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Drikschneider, 543 F. Supp. 
466 (D. Neb. 1981); BPI Sys. V. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208 (W.D. Tex. 1981); In re Certain 
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3. The Work Made for Hire Doctrine 
Section 21O(b) of the Copyright Act provides: 
(b) Works made/or hire - In the case of a work made for hire, 
the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is 
considered to be author for the purposes of this title and, unless the 
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument 
signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the 
copyright. 164 
Section 101 defines a "work made for hire" as: 
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her 
employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for 
use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation,. . . , if the par­
ties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the 
work shall be considered a work made for hire. . . .165 
To date there appears to be only one software-related case on this 
point. In BPI Sys., Inc. v. Leith,166 the plaintiff was developing an 
accounts receivable system and contracted with defendant to produce 
some twelve programs to be embodied in that system. The controlling 
issue was whether these programs constituted work made for hire, or 
in other words, whether the defendant was the plaintiff's employee. 
The court decided the question in the negative,167 and denied relief. 
An interesting case not related to software was Black, 168 in which 
the court held that when an employer materially breaches the employ­
ment agreement, there arises a claim for rescission of the contract, 
Personal Computers and Components Thereof, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 270 (Int. Tr. Comm. 
1984); In re Certain Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 217 (Int. 
Tr. Comm. 1981); Cinematronics, Inc. v. K. Noma Enters. Co., Ltd., D. Ariz. Civ. 81-439 
PHX-EHC; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Sutra Import Corp., D. Ariz., Civ. No. 81-438 PHX­
CLH. 
164. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982). 
165. Id. § 101. 
166. 532 F. Supp. 208 (W.D. Tex. 1981). 
167. Id. This work was performed at [d]efendant's place of business on his 
own computers. He was paid per program and no social security or income tax 
was deducted from his pay. Although [p]laintiff could accept or reject the final 
product, it had no right to control the manner of the work performed by 
Ld]efendant. To aid him in the project, [p]laintitf supplied him with certain inter­
nal, confidential documents which were not available to the public . . . . De­
fendant was not an employee of [P]laintiff acting within the scope of his 
employment. The work he did was specially ordered and commissioned but there 
was no written agreement that the work was 'work made for hire.' 
Id. 
168. Black v. Pizza Time Theatres, Inc., 1983 CoPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) ~ 25,569 
(N.D. Cal. 1983). 
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"including the implied right to authorship."169 By analogy, similar 
argument may be made in the absence of an employer/employee rela­
tionship where the parties have executed a writing specifying that the 
work is made for hire. 
It is anticipated that the work made for hire doctrine may result 
in more problems in the program scenario than in more traditional 
areas of copyright protection. The reason is that in certain segments 
of the software industry it is common to take a working module which 
performs a particular function, and incorporate it in a second program 
where, with or without modification, it will perform a similar function. 
It may then be taken from the second program and, with or without 
modification, installed in a third. Further, loose consulting arrange­
ments without written agreement often are the modus operandi of the 
software industry. Accordingly, this may give rise to more work made 
for hire problems than in an area such as book publishing. 
4. Advantages and Disadvantages of Copyright Protection 
Among the advantages of copyright protection for programs are: 
(1) the relative ease and inexpensiveness of securing170 and maintain­
ing it; (2) its suitability for great proliferation; (3) the extraordinary 
duration of protection; and (4) the realistic possibility of securing pre­
liminary relief in the event of litigation. Among the disadvantages are: 
(1) the uncertainty of its applicability to programs; (2) even more fun­
damentally, the uncertainty as to scope of protection; and (3) the diffi­
culty of policing. 
C. Trade Secret Protection ofSoftware 
1. Classical Trade Secret Protection 
Trade secret is in fact the method which has been used more fre­
quently than any other to protect software.l7l A trade secret is "any 
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used 
in one's business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an 
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."172 Basically, 
the traditional trade secret doctrine states that when a business has 
secret information which gives it a commercial advantage over com­
169. Id. 
170. Indeed, under the 1976 Act, the program is copyrighted upon being represented 
in tangible form. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). 
171. For a discussion of trade secret protection of software, see Bender, Trade Secret 
Protection ofSoftware, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 909 (1970); Bender, Trade Secret Software 
Protection, 5 Am. P.L.A.Q.J. 49 (1977). 
172. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, §757 comment b (1939). 
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petitors not in possession of the information, a court will afford protec­
tion against unauthorized use or disclosure, but not against one who 
independently develops.173 Programs, data bases, and documentation 
may all be protectable as trade secrets. Various characteristics and 
representations of programs such as algorithms, architecture, and flow 
charts may likewise be protectable. 
Unlike its statutory cousins, the scope of whose applicability is in 
issue, traditional trade secret law clearly applies to programs. The 
scope of protection seems reasonably clear}14 Trade secret rights arise 
by operation of law in many situations where a confidential relation­
ship is to be implied, such as the employer/employee relationship. But 
even in such situations, a well drafted contract may be preferred, as it 
can serve to make rights more specific, to give notice, and to create 
additional rights. 17s A study conducted a year before enactment of the 
Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980 concluded that software 
developers would continue to rely most heavily on trade secret protec­
tion for their programs. 176 
One interesting point is that trade secret protection is available 
against appropriation by memory; 177 no tangible item need be carried 
off,178 This view was affirmed in a case dealing with software}19 An­
173. See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §757, 758 (1939). 
174. See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 521, 5 
Computer L. Servo Rep. (Callaghan) 1 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); 
University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 183 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 70S, 5 Computer L. Servo Rep. (Callaghan) 1248, reh'g. denied, 505 F.2d 1304 (5th 
Cir. 1974); Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. V. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1020, 6 
Computer L. Servo Rep. (Callaghan) 999 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Co. 1977); see also Elec­
tronic Data Sys. Corp. V. Kinder, 497 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1974); Com-share, Inc. V. Com­
puter Complex, Inc., 458 F.2d 1341, 3 Computer L. Servo Rep. (Callaghan) 479 (6th Cir. 
1972); Structural Dynamics Research Corp. V. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 
F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Electronic Data Sys. Corp. V. Powell, 508 S.W.2d 137 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
175. However, there is a tendency by courts to strictly construe such a contract, 
thereby extinguishing any pre-existing rights. Accordingly, care should be exercised in 
drafting the agreement. See Gordon & Starr supra, note 6 at 488-89. 
176. Kidder, Peabody Study, reported in Call Trade Secret Laws Best Way to Protect 
Investment, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Jan. 14, 1980, at 54. 
177. Were such protection unavailable, trade secret protection of programs might be 
partly academic. Competent programmers and systems analysts spending much of their 
time with a program remember the program's structure, large segments of the algorithms 
and portions of the coding. 
178. Support for this position is stronger for the technological trade secret than for 
the collection of information (Le., the customer list, and presumably the data base). 
179. Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. V. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1020, 6 
Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 999 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977). For the general rule, see, 
e.g., A. H. Emery CO. V. Marean Prods. Co., 268 F.Supp. 289, 153 U.S.P.Q. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 
1967), affd, 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968); Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. 
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other interesting point is that trade secret law has its criminal side. 180 
Aside from general larceny statutes which may apply,181 about half of 
the states have specific trade secret theft statutes. 182 While United 
States copyright law has criminal sanctions (for willful infringe­
ment),183 the patent law has none. 
2. The Preemption Problem 
However, a recent challenge to classical trade secret protection is 
posed by the possibility of preemption for this entire corpus of law, or 
particular aspects of it, by Section 301(a) of the new Copyright Act: 
On or after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that 
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights that are within the gen­
eral scope of copyright as specified by Section 106 in works of au­
thorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come 
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by Sections 102 
and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether pub­
lished or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. There­
after, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right on 
any such work under the common law or statutes of any State. 184 
The existence of this section poses the issue of whether it 
preempts trade secret protection, wholly or in part, and the past few 
years have witnessed a number of cases dealing with possible preemp­
tion of diverse areas of law. 
v. Crampton, 361 Mass. 835, 282 N.E. 2d 921, (1972); Central Plastics Co. v. Goodson, 537 
P.2d 330, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 748 (Okla. 1975). 
For a discussion of trade secret protection available against appropriation by memory, 
see Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, supra note 171 at 909, 938-41; Bender, 
Trade Secret Software Protection, supra note 171, at 55-59. 
180. For a discussion of this aspect, see Bender, Trade Secret Protection ofSoftware, 
supra note 171, at 942-56. See also Bender, Trade Secret Software Protection, supra note 
171, at 59-65. 
181. See Hancock v. State, 402 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966), affd sub. nom. 
Hancock v. Decker, 379 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam). Indeed, the trade secret 
criminal statutes seem to be used more in the case of software than in the case of any other 
type of subject matter. Three reasons are often given as justification for the necessity of a 
criminal remedy: (1) difficulty of civil suit; (2) judgment-proof misappropriators; and (3) 
empty threat of civil suit where only nominal investment is necessary for misappropriator 
to exploit. The second and third bases are more likely to apply to a misappropriator of 
software than of most other types of subject matter. 
182. For an example of prosecution under such a statute for software misappropria­
tion, see Ward v. Superior Court of Calif., 3 Computer L. Servo Rep. (Callaghan) 206 (Cal. 
Super. 1972). See also Soma, Smith & Sprague, Legal Analysis ofElectronic Bulletin Board 
Activities, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV., 571, 621 (1985). 
183. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1982). 
184. Id. § 301(a). 
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In the trade secret area, one casel8S held that a complaint alleging 
that defendant "without proper authority obtained and improperly 
utilized copies of. . . proprietary drawings" states a claim which is 
preempted by section 301(a) because "The facts relate to rights that 
are equivalent to the exclusive rights belonging to a copyright 
holder...."186 The court believed preemption mandated where a 
claim does not allege the elements of "invasion of privacy, a trespass, a 
breach of trust or a breach of confidentiality,"187 and the court ruled 
that this claim (specifically denominated as being for "misappropria­
tion of trade secrets") failed to allege such an element. 188 And in a 
case involving a computer program, a court held at least certain as­
pects of state trade secret law were pre-empted by federal copyright 
law. 189 
In another case involving a computer program, however, another 
district court held that section 301 does not preempt, because a trade 
secret claim is not "equivalent" to copyright claim. l90 "It is well set­
tled that copyright protection extends not to an idea itself, but rather 
to the particular expression. . . . In contrast, the protection provided 
by the common law of trade secret misappropriation extends to the 
'd 191very 1 eas .... 
3. Combined Trade Secret and Copyright Protection of 
Programs 
Some have suggested attempting to secure the advantages of both 
copyright and trade secret protection. In such a situation the owner 
marks the program with both copyright notice and proprietary legend. 
The intention is to keep the program secret. The copyright marking is 
meant to provide protection only in the event this fails, and the pro­
185. Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 894 (M.D. Ala. 
1980), affd on other grounds, 676 F.2d 494 (11th Cir.), cen. denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982). 
186. Id. at 895-96. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 897-98. Other cases dealt with neither computer programs nor trade 
secrets, and held that there was no preemption as to unfair competition. Factors, Etc., Inc. 
v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090,208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (a right to 
publicity); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496F. Supp. 408, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
630 (S.D. Ohio 1980)(a state statute relating to "blind bidding" for motion pictures); Le0­
nard Storch Enter. v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 623 (E.D.N.Y. 
1979), complaint dismissed, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (misappropriation by 
photographically reproducing typefaces). 
189. Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 564 F. Supp 1471 (D. Nev. 1983). 
190. Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., Inc., 522 F. Supp. 367, 368 
(N.D. III. 1981). 
191. Id. 
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gram markings may so state. Once the owner elects to utilize copy­
right protection, he or she may presumably register and deposit copies. 
It can be argued that disseminating with copyright notice, even in 
a confidential relationship and where accompanied by a proprietary 
notice, constitutes "publication" and thereby strips the program of its 
trade secret status. An ancillary and more fundamental question goes 
to whether seeking this type of bifurcated protection may be inher­
ently inconsistent with public policy. One. major purpose of the copy­
right law is to promote disclosure. The question may be legitimately 
raised as to whether copyright protection should be countenanced 
when the owner's real purpose is to thwart disclosure and to rely on 
his copyright (if one exists) only if this fails and publication occurs as a 
result of events beyond the owner's control. 
In a case involving an allegation that defendants misappropriated 
plaintiffs computer system reference manual, the document had been 
marked with both a proprietary legend and a statutory copyright no­
tice. 192 The district court held that the act of affixing the copyright 
notice did not, as a matter oflaw, defeat the trade secret claim. 193 The 
court of appeals, dealing only with the argument of estoppel (and not 
treating the Constitutional and policy arguments which might be 
made), agreed. 194 
4. Advantages and Disadvantages of Trade Secrets 
Among the advantages of trade secret protection of programs are: 
(1) the real possibility of securing preliminary relief in the event of 
litigation; (2) its clear applicability; (3) its applicability to intermediate 
(flow chart) and ancillary (documentation) materials; (4) the broad 
scope of protection (concept, disclosure, and use); (5) the relatively 
limited opportunity for misuse, because generally there is not uncon­
trolled proliferation; (6) the possibility of lengthy duration; and (7) the 
rapidity with which protection can attach (immediately). 
There are, however, several disadvantages to trade secret protec­
tion of programs. One disadvantage, from the viewpoint of society if 
not the developer, is the unfortunate effect which the resultant "cess­
pool of secrecy" may have on progress in the field. A second disad­
vantage is that secrecy is not well suited to a product for which wide 
192. Technicon Medical Information Sys. Corp. v. Green Bay Packaging, 211 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 343 (E.D. Wis. 1980). 
193. Id. at 347. 
194. Technican Medical Information Sys. Corp. v. Green Bay Packaging, 687 F.2d 
1032,215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1001 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 732 (1983). 
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proliferation is sought. Indeed, there may be inherent in the definition 
of a trade secret the notion that it not be known to most competitors 
of the owner or user.19S However, in one case dealing squarely with 
that issue (where software was the res in question),196 the court saw no 
infirmity arising by virtue of mere proliferation. A third disadvantage 
is the possibility of an immediate loss of protection, should the secret 
become public. A fourth disadvantage is that affirmative steps must be 
taken to maintain the trade secret. Finally, the possibility of pre-emp­
tion is a recognizable disadvantage. 
VI. THE SHRINK WRAP LICENSE 
The "shrink wrap" is a phenomenon which has arisen in re­
sponse to an attempt to protect relatively inexpensive, mass marketed 
software. A brief historical summary will be helpful in describing how 
certain pertinent aspects of the software industry have changed, and 
given rise to such a need. 
In the early days of computing, a typical mainframe computer 
cost hundreds of thousands (and perhaps over a million) dollars. The 
application software was all custom developed, and a typical program 
might cost tens of thousands (or even more than a hundred thousand) 
dollars. Then, slowly, the concept of the program package made in­
roads. However, a typical program package for a mainframe com­
puter might cost on the order of $50,000. Legal protection in those 
days was provided almost exclusively by the law of trade secrets, with 
a written license contract signed by the parties. It was drafted by law­
yers and often the transaction was negotiated by lawyers. 
The key elements were that each such transaction was substantial 
and that the parties were corporations, to whom contracts and lawyers 
were a way of life. 
However, the technology advanced rapidly. The price of hard­
ware plummeted and the industry saw the introduction of the personal 
computer. Today, most computers in existence cost less than $10,000; 
indeed many cost less then $2,000. As the price of hardware fell, in­
creasing numbers of computers were sold. As to certain models, there 
are presently hundreds of thousands of units. On some models, there 
are more than one million units extant. Today a copy of a typical 
195. The Restatement of Torts lists six factors for use in the determination as to 
whether a trade secret exists. One is the extent to which the subject matter is known 
outside the enterprise; another is the ease with which it may properly be acquired by others. 
REsrATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment 10, at 6 (1939). 
196. Management Science America, Inc. v. Cyborg Syst., Inc., 6 Computer L. Serv. 
Rep. (Callaghan) 921 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
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personal computer program may be marketed at a price in the range of 
fifty to perhaps eight hundred dollars. These are marketed over the 
counter like expensive jelly beans. At these prices, there are no law­
yers; moreover, even asking the buyer to sign a form contract is 
viewed by many as imposing an impediment to sales. 
In this environment, how does the software developer protect his 
investment? One proposed solution is the shrink wrap (also called the 
boxtop, tear-open, or blister) license. The programming device on 
which the copy of the program is embodied is a floppy disk197 or a 
ROM198 which comes encased in a clear plastic wrapper. Visible 
through this wrapper is a sheet of paper bearing, in large print, a no­
tice stating that whoever breaks the wrapper199 thereby agrees to a list 
of stated conditions. 
A question sometimes asked is why the marketer bothers with 
such a procedure. Why not simply copyright the program and let it go 
at that? Aside from the fact that the scope of copyright protection is 
not well established, the answer generally given is that there are ele­
ments of protection which can probably not be secured by copyright 
alone and which many software developers view as valuable. For ex­
ample, the copyright law would not prohibit the owner of a copy, in 
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, from selling or leasing 
that copy. Or, the developer may wish to limit the use of each copy to 
a particular computer or terminal. Copyright alone will not do that. 
Furthermore, the developer may wish to protect the trade secrets em­
bodied in the program against reverse engineering and disassembly.2°O 
Again, copyright alone may not serve the purpose. 
Accordingly, many vendors now sell copies of their programs ac­
companied by a shrink-wrap license. Possible problems arise in con­
nection with this practice. For example, a valid contract requires offer 
and acceptance, and there is a question as to whether this has been 
achieved in the typical shrink-wrap situation. The buyer presumably 
paid his consideration at the time he purchased the copy, which is 
before he opened the wrapper or otherwise purportedly activated the 
terms of the shrink wrap license. However, to the extent there has 
197. A floppy disk looks like a 45 rpm phonograph record, and records the program 
on one or both surfaces in the form of magnetic impulses. It is similar to a hard disk, 
except that the floppy disk is generally smaller and flexible. 
198. The actual tiny silicon chip comprising the ROM is embodied in a plastic casing 
about the size of a cigarette pack. 
199. Alternatively, the notice may key acceptance to breaking an inner wrapper 
(which contains only the programming device), or using the programming device. 
200. See Gordon & Starr supra, note 6 at SOL 
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been any acceptance of those terms, presumably it took place only 
when he opened the shrink wrap. Is it possible to convert a sale into a 
license? 
Moreover, there appears to be a modern trend in consumer ori­
ented law which makes it difficult to enforce "adhesion contracts" 
where the result is deemed unfair. Would that pose a problem for the 
shrink wrap license? Further, a litigation problem is posed by the pos­
sible difficulty of proving notice. Since many purchasers of copies of 
personal computer programs have not yet reached the age of majority, 
they may not possess the capacity to enter into a contract. There ap­
pear to be no cases on point as yet. 
VII. INTERNATIONAL SOFTWARE PROTECTION 
There are two ways of seeking software protection abroad. One is 
by using an international copyright convention or treaty and the other 
is by using the domestic law of the country in question. 
A. By Convention 
There are two important multilateral copyright conventions. The 
Berne Convention (formally the International Union for the Protec­
tion of Literary and Artistic Works) is administered by the World In­
tellectual Property Organization (WIPO).201 Although the United 
States has never joined the Berne Convention, American nationals can 
secure its protection through pUblication in a Berne country simulta­
neously with publication in the United States.202 The Universal Copy­
right Convention is administered by UNESCO.203 Under this treaty, 
201. As of January 1, 1984, the following nations had ratified the Berne Convention: 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belguim, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cam­
eroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech­
. oslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, 
Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guinea, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ire­
land, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mada­
gascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Surinam, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and 
Zimbabwe. 4 M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT App. 22 (1984). 
202. Berne Conv., Art 6(1) (Brussels Act); Art 3(1)(b) (Paris Act). See generally 4 
M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT, § 17.04(d) (1984). 
203. As of January 1, 1984 the following nations had ratified the Geneva Act of 1952 
and the Paris Act of 1971. The following chart has been reprinted with permission from 4 
M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT App. 22 (1984), Copyright © 1984 by Matthew 
Bender & Co., Inc. 

Contracting State Geneva Act of 1952 Paris Act of 1971 
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August 28, 1973 
September 16, 1955 
February 13, 1958 
May I, 1969 
July 2, 1957 
December 27, 1976 
August 5, 1975 
June 18, 1983 
August 31, 1960 
December I, 1982 
January 13, 1960 
June 7, 1975 
May I, 1973 
August 10, 1962 
September 16, 1955 
June 18, 1976 
September 16, 1955 
June 18, 1957 
January 6, 1960 
September 16, 1955 
February 9, 1962 
May 8, 1983 
June 5, 1957 
March 29, 1979 
October 10, 1970 
April 16, 1963 
January 14, 1956 
October 5, 1973 
September 16, 1955 
August 22, 1962 
August 24, 1963 
October 28, 1964 
November 13, 1981 
September 16, 1955 
October 5, 1955 
January 23, 1971 
December 18, 1956 
January 21, 1958 
January 20, 1959 
September 16, 1955 
January 24, 1957 
April 28, 1956 
September 7, 1966 
September 16, 1955 
October 17, 1959 
July 27, 1956 
January 22, 1959 
October 15, 1955 
October 26, 1965 
November 19, 1968 
July 10, 1974 
February 28, 1978 
August 14, 1982 
December 27, 1976 
August 5, 1975 
June 18, 1983 
December I, 1982 
December II, 1975 
June 7, 1975 
July 10, 1974 
June 18, 1976 
March 7, 1980 
April 17, 1980 
July 11, 1979 
May 8 1983 
March 29, 1979 
July 10, 1974 
December 10, 1980 
July 10, 1974 
November 13, 1981 
May 6,1980 
July 10, 1974 
January 25, 1980 
October 21, 1977 
July 10, 1974 
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signatories at least as much copyright protection as that state accords 
works of its own nationals first published there. 204 
A French court has ruled that, aside from whether French do­
mestic copyright law applies, a videogame registered with the U.S. 
Copyright Office is protected in France by virtue of Article II of the 
Universal Copyright Convention, signed "by the United States and 
France: ". . . published works of nationals of any contracting state 
and works first published in that state shall enjoy in each contracting 
state the same protection as that other state accords in its own terri­
tory, as well as the protection specifically granted by the 
Convention."205 
One question pertinent to the program milieu is whether this obli­
gation applies to rights not contained in the state's copyright laws, but 
which may be rights in the nature of copyright. More specifically, if a 
foreign country's copyright law does not permit protection of pro­
grams, but its trade secret, patent, or other laws provide rights in the 
nature of copyright protection for the programs, can a U.S. national 
Mauritius March 12, 1968 
Mexica May 12, 1957 October 31, 1975 
Monaco September 16, 1955 December 13, 1974 
Morocco May 8,1972 January 28, 1976 
Netherlands June 22, 1967 
New Zealand September 11, 1964 
Nicaragua August 16, 1961 
Nigeria February 14, 1962 
Norway January 23, 1963 August 7, 1974 
Pakistan September 16, 1955 
Panama October 17, 1962 September 3, 1980 
Paraguay March 11, 1962 
Peru October 16, 1963 
Phillippines November 19, 1955 
Poland March 9, 1977 March 9, 1977 
Portugal December 25, 1956 July 30, 1981 
Senegal July 9, 1974 July 10, 1974 
Soviet Union May 27, 1973 
Spain September 16, 1955 July 10, 1974 
Sri Lanka January 25, 1984 January 25, 1984 
Sweden July 1, 1961 July 10, 1974 
Switzerland March 30, 1956 
Tunisia June 19, 1969 June 10, 1975 
United Kingdom September 27, 1957 July 10, 1974 
United States of America September 16, 1955 July 10, 1974 
Venezuela September 30, 1966 
Yugoslavia May 11, 1966 July 10, 1974 
Zambia June 1, 1965 
4 M. NIMMER, supra note 201, § 1704[B].204. 
205. Universal Copyright Convention, Art. II, completed at Geneva on Sept. 6, 
1952. 
• • • 
• •• 
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claim such protection by virtue of the convention?206 
B. Foreign Domestic Law 
Based on reports believed reliable, the following sets forth, if in 
somewhat fragmentary form, the existing and prospective domestic 
law of program protection for a number of foreign countries.207 In 
general, the application of law to the program scenario is less well 
developed abroad that in the United States. 
1. Japan208 
Taito v. [NG Enterprises209 was an action for infringement of a 
copyright on a program written in assembly language. The alleged 
infringement constituted copying a ROM embodying the program.210 
206. To the extent such other laws do not distinguish between nationals and foreign­
ers, perhaps nothing turns on the answer to this question. 
207. The following section on foreign domestic law is based, in part, on various 
materia1s, believed to embody accurate information, which have come to the author's atten­
tion. It is designed to serve merely as a survey of current software protection law develop­
ments in progress. Where possible, the author has provided complete citations to foreign 
case law, statutory law, and secondary sources. 
208. The information on Japan has been derived from the English Edition of 
Yamasaki, Japanese Case Law Report, AIPPI J. 107 (Sept. 1983). 
209. Id. at 107-08. Tokyo Dist. Ct., Dec. 6, 1982. 





"(I) The terms in each of the following items shall have the meaning as defined in 
each item as far as the present Law is concerned: 
1. Work - Creative expression ofthoughts or sentiments which falls within the 
literary, scientific, artistic or musical domain. 
15. Reproduction - Remaking in a tangible form by means ofprintlng, photog­
raphy, copying, sound or visual recording and other methods [the remainder 
omitted]. 
"(Exemplification of works) 
"Article 10 
"(I) The works of the present Law shall comprise the following by way of 
example: 
1. novels, dramas, articles, lectures and other literary works 
2. works of music 
3. works of choreography or pantomime 




5. works of architecture 
6. works of cartography and other figurative works of 

scientific nature, such as plans, charts and models 

7. works of cinematography 
8. works of photography 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
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The issues were whether a program may constitute a copyrightable 
work and whether an object program embodied in ROM constitutes a 
copy.211 
Defendant argued that this program was not copyrightable be­
cause the symbolic source language was not readily comprehensible to 
people and, therefore, was not a means for expressing thought. The 
court held that the program was indeed copyrightable and that the 
ROM embodying the object code constituted a copy. The object ofthe 
program was to cause a display of a video game, and the expression in 
symbolic language was comprehensible to persons with expert knowl­
edge. Different programs could produce the same result and the pro­
gram was seen by the court as a creative expression of thought, and 
copyrightable. The court noted that the object program embodied in 
ROM was a mechanical conversion of the source program. No crea­
tivity was involved in converting one into the other. Creating such a 
ROM constituted making a copy of the source program. 
On the legislative front, a subcommittee of the Copyright Council 
"(Right of reproduction) 
"Article 21 
An author shall have an exclusive right to reproduce his works. 
"(Right of injunction) 
"Article 112 
"(I) An author, copyright owner or owner of the rights of publication or neigh­
boring rights may demand that those who infringe or are likely to infringe his 
copyright, rights of publication or neighboring rights take measures to effect dis­
continuance or prevention of such infringement. 
"(Acts deemed to be infringements) 
"Article 113 
"(I) The following acts shall be deemed to be infringements on the relevant 
moral rights, copyright, rights of publication or neighboring rights: 
2. acts to knowingly distribute those items produced by acts infringing moral 
rights, copyright, rights of publication or neighboring rights (including those 
items imported as provided for in the preceding item) 
"(presumption of the amount of damage, etc.) 
"Article 114 
"(1) When a. copyright owner, owner of the rights of publication or neighboring 
rights demands damages caused by infringement on such copyright, rights of pub­
lication or neighboring rights from those who effected such infringement, if such 
infringers have acquired profits by such acts of infringement, the amount of such 
profits shall be presumed to be the amount of damage said copyright owner, 
owner of the rights of publication or the neighboring rights has suffered." 
Id. 
211. Id. 
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(an advisory body to the Education Ministry) has proposed a fifty year 
term of copyright for programs. The Ministry for Posts and Telecom­
munications has also expressed an interest in the matter. However, 
the Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI) has pro­
posed a fifteen year term (the same as for Japanese patents), with au­
thority in the government to require compulsory licensing for a fee. 
The MITI proposal was withdrawn in 1984 but is expected to resur­
face in spring, 1985. In the United States, the Computer business 
Equipment Manufacturers Association (CBEMA) stated that its mem­
bers would reevaluate their plans in Japan if the MITI proposal were 




Prior to 1974, German courts permitted patents on certain 
programmable processes and programmed machines. In 1974, the 
German courts did an about face, and they have been negative ever 
since. Indeed, German courts have enunciated a number of negative 
rules, but no positive rules for patentability. 
In 1978, the Federal Republic of Germany enacted a new patent 
act in accord with the European Patent Convention. In the Act, pro­
grams are expressly excluded as such from patentability. 
b. Copyright 
VisiCorp brought an action in the Munich trial court against a 
group of German companies, alleging that they copied its VisiCorp 
program.2 12 
Section 2 of the German Copyright Act lists, inter alia, literary 
linguistic works, or representations of a scientific or technological na­
ture. Under German copyright law, a work within one of these cate­
gories, which is a personal intellectual creation, constitutes 
copyrightable subject matter. The court held that if the task permitted 
several different solutions, then the creative intellectual content of a 
program would be expressed by the choice, collection, review, arrange­
ment, and classification of the material. The court further held that 
programs meet the linguistic requirement despite the fact that pro­
grams are written in a special computer language and can be read only 
by special means. 
212. VisiCorp. v. Basis Software GMBH (21 Dec. 1982). 
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Moreover, the court ruled that a program also meets the scientific 
and technical requirement and that the intellectual-aesthetic content 
could be found not only in the visually perceptible form, but also "in 
the content of ideas which can be expressed in the formation and se­
quence of thoughts of the represented concepts and/or in the special 
intellectual form and kind of collection, classification and arrangement 
of the offered material."213 
In VisiCorp, with a relatively complex program with about 
10,000 instructions, the court has ample opportunity for personal crea­
tive formation entering into the program itself. Accordingly, the court 
held it copyrightable under Section 2.214 The decision is on appeal, 
with a ruling expected in 1985. The trial court in Cassel and the trial 
court in Mosbach have also held programs copyrightable. However, 
these decisions conflicted with a 1981 decision handed down by a trial 
court in Mannheim. 
Several laws pertaining to software protection are being consid­
ered. One would proscribe illegal copying of software, and another 
would make theft of programs a crime. According to an official in the 
German Ministry of Justice, 
there is no question that the loading of the program into the com­
puter system is a copying of the program. But what about the run­
ning of the program? . .. In my opinion, the answer has to be in 
the affirmative. When running the program, the transfer of each bit 
of information from one storage location to another within the com­
puter is copying the program.2lS 
3. Canada216 
As of summer, 1984, there were several pending cases involving 
copyrightability of programs in Canada, but no decisions. 
In May, 1984 the Canadian government released a "White Pa­
per" proposing revisions to the Copyright Act. Among the proposals 
was one which would protect machine-readable data bases and com­
puter programs and data bases for five years. Programs in human­
readable form would, as in the past, receive protection similar to that 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
215. Statement of Margaret Moeller, counselor in charge of copyright and publish­
ing law, Ministry of Justice, Federal Republic of Germany. 28 PAT. TRADEMARK & 
CoPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 183 (Aug. 30, 1984). 
216. See generally, Canadian Government Wants Limited Protection for Programs, 
CoMP. L. & TAX REp. 1 (Aug. 1984); and White Paper Outlines Changes in Canadian 
Copyright Statute, 28 PAT. TRADEMARK, & CoPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 132 (May 31, 1984). 
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afforded traditional literary works for fifty years plus life, with the 
owner having the right to prevent making machine-readable programs. 
If it is the human-readable program that is published, this right would 
terminate five years after the end of the year of creation of the human­
readable program in human-readable form. 
For an unpublished program in machine-readable form, the copy­
right holder would have the right to publish in machine-readable 
form, to reproduce, and to make a human-readable program based on 
it. However, he or she would not have the right to rent or use. Under 
this proposal, selling, leasing, licensing, trading, or offering to do any 
of these would be an act of publication. An unpublished machine­
readable program would be protected for five years from creation. If 
published, protection would run until five years after the end of the 
year of publication. However, if published more than five years after 
creation, the program would be ineligible for copyright protection. 
4. United Kingdom217 
a. Patent 
In the U.K., trade secret, contract, copyright (without registra­
tion or publication requirement), and patent are available to protect 
programs. 
In 1979, the U.K. passed a new Patent Act to bring about accord 
with the European Patent Convention and no pertinent decisions are 
yet available under the new act, although patents have regularly been 
granted for program implemented processes and systems. The new 
contributory infringement section of the Patent Act may well apply to 
the distribution of computer programs which would produce infringe­
ment when used. 
There are at least two organizations in the U.K. devoted to re­
straining the activities of computer software pirates: Federation 
Against Software Theft (FAST), and Federation Against Copyright 
Theft (FACT). 
b. Copyright 
Although the Copyright Act of 1956 makes no specific reference 
to programs,218 a number of cases have stated that programs would be 
protected as "literary works." In several cases granting ex parte appli­
cations to seize infringing goods, courts ruled that object code was a 
217. See generally Bishop, Legal Protection 0/ Computer Programs in the United 
Kingdom, 5 NW 1. INT'L L. & Bus. 269 (1983). 
218. Copyright Act, 1956,4 & 5 Eliz. 2, Ch. 74 
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reproduction or an adaptation of source code.219 
In a form not visible to humans, programs would probably still 
qualify as literary works, even though they would not be "writings." 
Published and unpublished works are protected by the act, and regis­
tration is not required. Copyright inheres at the time the unpublished 
literary work is make. It inheres in published works on first 
publication. 
c. Interaction of Copyright and Trade Secret 
Sometimes the owner may seek both copyright and trade secret 
protection for a program. Software used only in-house may be copy­
righted under section 2(1) ofthe 1956 Act as an unpublished work and 
may also be protected by confidentiality clauses. Here the principles 
of copyright and trade secret do not conflict. 
However, where copyright attaches under section 2(2) by virtue 
of publication, it is uncertain whether trade secret protection may also 
be claimed. Whether trade secret can be claimed will depend on the 
type of publication. English law is unclear as to what degree of publi­
cation is necessary before the information ceases to be protectable by 
trade secret. However, confidentiality is not stripped away merely 
where programs are marketed widely, even though capable of reverse 
engineering. The question then becomes how much work has to be 
done to accomplish the reverse engineering. In the case of multiple 
disclosures such as to licensees, the law is less likely to impose an obli­
gation of confidence where none is specifically set forth in the license 
agreement. 
Publication is insufficient to cause copyright to attach under sec­
tion 2(2) unless it is "intended to satisfy the reasonable requirements 
of the public."220 Placing a program on general sale to computer own­
ers does not necessarily end any claims to confidentiality. The pro­
gram may be protected as a trade secret if significant effort would be 
required to reverse engineer or copy the program. Publication to 
licensees would not necessarily end confidentiality of the software, es­
pecially if the license agreement contained a confidentiality clause. 
Many licensed programs would be protected under both the Copyright 
Act and trade secret law. 
219. Sega v. Richards, [1983] F.S.R. 73; System v. Landon, [1983] F.S.R. 313; 
Thrustone v. W.W Computer, [1983] F.S.R. 502; Format Conv. v. lIT, [1983] F.S.R. 473. 
220. Copyright Act 1956, § 49 (2)(b). 
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5. France221 
French law offers six methods which may be used to secure 
software protection. 
Although French patent law excludes patentability for a com­
puter program as such,222 a system or an embodied process may be 
patented. French design protection can be used to protect video 
games and other visual displays resulting from a program. It does not 
protect utilitarian objects when their designs are totally dependent on 
their utilitarian character. Registration of a picture or drawing is re­
quired, and the protection period is twenty-five years, renewable for 
another twenty-five years. At the depositor's request, the deposit will 
be kept secret. 
While French copyright law does not include programs expressly, 
a number of decisions have protected programs embodied in ROM or 
on a tape or diskette, whether operating systems or application pro­
grams, and whether in source or object code. An original literary or 
artistic work accrues copyright protection at creation, and registration 
is not required. 
A program is original if the result of an intellectual creative pro­
cess and if the program itself does not follow directly from the goal set 
by the programmer (Le., there must be choices among various pro­
gramming steps). 
French law recognizes protection through total or partial secrecy. 
In the case of total secrecy (where the program is disclosed to no one 
outside the enterprise), one who steals it through an employee is liable 
under the criminal law. In the case of partial secrecy (where there is a 
license with non-disclosure agreement), the civil law provides a rem­
edy. Secrecy does not preclude protection by copyright law. 
Among the remedies provided by criminal law are unlawful dis­
closure of a trade secret,223 disclosure of a professional secret,224 abuse 
of confidence,225 corruption,226 and theft.227 A decision under Article 
418 held that it applied to programs; applicability had been unclear 
221. See generally BERTRAND, LEGAL PROTECfION OF CoMPUTER SOFIWARE IN 
FRANCE: 1984 DEVELOPMENTS, III SOFlWARE PROTECfION 1 (1984). 
222. See Article 6 of the French Patent Law (adapted to Article 52 of the European 
Patent Convention). 
223. Penal Code Art. 418. 
224. Art. 378. 
225. Art. 408. 
226. Art. 177-79. 
227. Art. 379. 
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because courts traditionally did not apply this provision to services.228 
The civil law recognizes causes of action for misappropriation of 
intellectual work and for unjust enrichment. 
When several employees collaborate to produce a work, and the 
contribution of each cannot be separated from the whole,' the law 
deems it a "collective work," which belongs to the employer. 
There have been a number of projects directed toward the issue of 
how software should be protected. In August, 1983, the Minister of 
Industry established a commission under the guidance of the patent 
office to report on the present status and to propose changes. A report 
presented in December, 1983, suggested continuing present law but 
adding a new system of protection specifically directed to computer 
programs and providing twenty years of protection for algorithms of 
registered programs. 
6. Australia 
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Computer Edge Pty, Ltd.,229 the trial 
court denied protection, finding that computer programs were not 
within the subject matter copyrightable under Australian law. The 
appellate court reversed. In light of the confusion, the Copyright Act 
of 1968 was amended. However, the new act does not specifically ex­
tend protection to machine-readable software.23o 
228. 	 SESA C.v. TC NANTERRE, 5 Mai 1981, reported in Expertises 1983, No. 57 at 
579. 
229. 	 [1984] F.S.R. 246 Rev. 53. 
230. 	 Copyright Amendment 1984, No. 43.: 
1. adding a definition of "computer program" to of the Act as follows: 
" 'computer program' means and expression, in any language, code or notation, 
of a set of instructions (whether with or without related information) intended, 
either directly or after either or both of the following: 
(a) conversion to another language, code or notation; 
(b) reproduction in a different material form, to cause a device having digital 
information processing capabilities to perform a particular function"; 
2. adding to the existing category or "literary works" in Section 10 the following: 
"(a) 	 a table, or compilation expressed in words, figures or symbols (whether or 
not in a visible form); 
(b) a computer program or compilation of computer program"; 
3. Specifically defining an "adaptation" of a computer program to include a transla­
tion from one language to another, i.e., "a version of the work (whether or not in the 
language, code or notation in which the work was originally expressed) not being a repro­
duction of the work" (Section 10); 
4. redefining the term "infringing copy" in section 10 to include copies of adaptations 
of works and to remove an anomaly whereby software imported with permission might 
nevertheless technically be considered an infringing copy; 
5. defining "material form" in Section 10 to include "any form (whether visible or 
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7. 	 South Africa 
In a 1981 case, plaintiff's employee developed an accounting 
package for professionals, but refused to turn over the source code to 
his employer.231 The court held that under the applicable 1978 Copy­
right Act, these programs were copyrightable subject matter, and that 
the employee owned them.232 The court did not proscribe his redevel­
opment of similar programs ab initio, even were he to use the knowl­
edge he had gained. Certain language in the case suggests that data 
bases are not protectable under South African copyright law. 
8. 	 Brazil 
Brazil appears ready to create a system of legal protection unique 
not) of storage from which the work or adaptation, or a substantial part of the work or 
adaptation, can be reproduced"; 
6. creating a presumption that the making of a back-up copy of a computer program 
is not an infringement by adding a new Section 43A, which states: 
"43A. (1) Subject to sub-section (2), the copyright in a literary work being a 
computer program is not infringed by the making of a reproduction of the work, 
or of a computer program being an adaptation of the work, if­
(a) 	 the reproduction is made by, or on behalf of, the owner of the copy (in this 
Section referred to as the 'original copy') from which the reproduction is 
made; and 
(b) 	 the reproduction is made for the purpose only of being used, by or on behalf 
ofthe owner of the original copy, in lieu of the original copy in the event the 
original copy is lost, destroyed or rendered unusable. 
(2) Sub-section (1) does not apply to the making of a reproduction of a computer 
program, or of an adaptation of a computer program­
(a) 	 from an infringing copy of the computer program; or 
(b) 	 contrary to an express direction by or on behalf of the owner of the copy­
right in the computer program given to the owner of the original copy not 
later than the time when the owner of the original copy acquired the original 
copy. 
(3) For the purposes of this section­
(a) 	 a reference to a copy of a computer program or of an adaptation of a com­
puter program is a reference to any article in which the computer program 
or adaptation is reproduced in a material form; and 
(b) 	 a reference to an express direction, in relation to a copy of a computer pro­
gram or of adaptation of a computer program, includes a reference to a 
clearly legible direction printed on the copy or on a package in which the 
copy is supplied"; 
7. extending "the anti-piracy" provisions of the current law (Section 132) to cover 
creation of infringing copies by telephone or radio transmission of a program; 
8. Creating an offense for advertising the supply of infringing copies of a program; 
9. conferring copyright protection on existing programs; and, 
10. exempting actions that took place prior to the commencement of the amendments 
from being considered infringements. 
231. Northern Office Microcomputers v. Rosenstein, 1981 (4 C.P.D. 123). 
232. A 1980 amendment apparently has altered the situation so that the employer 
would own programs written after May 22, 1980. 
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to computer programs.233 Under the draft being circulated in late 
summer, 1984, the law would require registration of source and object 
code as a condition for protection, and would grant exclusive rights 
for ten years. All documentation, including source code, would be 
maintained in sealed form by the government to insure free use upon 
expiration. 
To maintain the registration, the producer would be compelled to 
provide technical assistance to users during the registration period, 
and in the event of national urgency, would be required to grantthird 
parties the right to reproduce. Compulsory licensing of Brazilian 
companies would be required.234 In addition, there would be a re­
quirement for active use of the software, possibly within two years of 
registration.235 
9. Hungary236 
"Authorities" have determined that software is covered under the 
country's existing copyright law as a writing, albeit a special type. 
Hungary favors utilizing copyright protection, rather than creating sui 
generis protection for software, both because it would require time to 
develop a unique system and because such protection would be limited 
to a single country without possibility of similar international 
protection.237 
to. Taiwan 
The Taiwanese legislature is expected to receive in 1984 a revised 
copyright bill which would explicitly extend protection to 
programs.238 
11. Mexico 
Mexico began accepting programs for copyright registration in 
October, 1984. Mexico appears to be closely watching events in 
Brazi1.239 
233. Such a conclusion seemed apparent by the end of an international seminar on 
legal protection of software, held in Brasilia in early summer 1984. The seminar was under 
the auspices of the Special Secretariat for Information, which was expected to. propose such 
a software protection law by the end of 1984. 
234. This requirement is similar to that found in Brazilian patent law. 
235. 28 PAT. TRADEMARK & CoPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 482 (Aug. 30, 1984). 
236. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
237. 28 PAT. TRADEMARK & CoPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 482 (Aug. 30, 1984), Report 0/ 
Gyorgy Palos, Director 0/ the Legal Department, Bureau 0/ Copyright Protection. 
238. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
239. Id. 
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12. Spain 
Spain is amending its copyright law.240 Despite internal pressure 
to dilute software protection, Spain must strengthen intellectual prop­
erty protection as a prerequisite for entry into the European 
community. 
1~. Colombia 
Based on reports believed reliable,241 Columbia is closely watch­
ing events in Brazil with respect to developing domestic laws for pro­
gram protection. 
14. Malaysia 
The government intends242 to amend its copyright law, strength­
ening protection. Domestic manufacturers seek increased protection 
so as to better participate in joint ventures with foreign software man­
ufacturers. However, the National Computer Board is looking seri­
ously at the Japanese MITI approach. 
15. Singapore 
Reliable reports243 indicate that Singapore, like Malaysia, intends 
to amend its copyright law to strengthen program protection. 
16. Thailand 
Thailand, like Malaysia and Singapore, is preparing to amend its 
copyright law to strengthen program protection. 244 
17. Sweden 
Sweden is considering legislation similar to U.S. copyright 
legislation.245 
18. Netherlands 
The Netherlands is considering legislation similar to U.S. copy­
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VIII. EXTRALEGAL MEANS FOR PROTECTING PROGRAMS 
Legal means are but one vehicle for seeking to protect programs, 
and there are certain other means which may be at least as effective in 
a given situation. In addition to the suggestions in this section, some 
of those set forth below247 bear on extralegal methods of protection. 
Basically, extralegal means of achieving protection are based on struc­
turing the commercial environment in such a way as to reduce the 
incentive to misappropriate, and the use of technology so as to render 
it more difficult to misappropriate. 
Commercially, there are two steps which some licensors may take 
to protect their investment in programs. The first is to provide main­
tenance for their licensed programs. Although the licensor generally 
undertakes significant (sometimes massive) debugging activities before 
licensing, the typical licensed program is an extremely complex item, 
containing numerous bugs which will manifest themselves on a contin­
uing basis for years. Anyone of these is capable, under the right 
(more appropriately, the wrong) set of circumstances, of immobilizing 
a licensee's efforts when a bug causes the program to cease running or 
to run improperly. Most licensees will, therefore, be willing to pay an 
additional fee for licensor maintenance (sometimes called "support"). 
In providing this support, the licensor agrees, on a timely basis, to 
remedy any bug uncovered by the licensee. Some licensors market the 
support under the basic licensing agreement, while others may market 
it as an additional optional item. Yet others offer no support. 
A second commercial offering which may afford some protection 
is providing program enhancements. Many programs are such that it 
is economically feasible to improve them as time progresses. For ex­
ample, new options may be added to increase the number of functions 
which the program can perform. Furthermore, changes may be made 
in certain algorithms to reduce running time. Where enhancements 
are to be supplied, provision is generally made in the licensing 
agreement. 
The value of a program without support or right to enhancement 
(this is what a misappropriator generally gets) is often far less than 
that of a supported program with enhancement rights. Accordingly, 
the incentive to misappropriate the bare program is reduced 
somewhat. 
Technologically, one might alter either the software or the hard­
ware in such a manner that each physical programming device, or 
247. See infra note 252 and accompanying text. 
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copies of it, will operate only with a specific computer. For example, 
provision might be made in the program to incorporate a comparison 
between the serial number of the computer on which the program is 
running248 and the serial number of the computer for which the pro­
gram is licensed.249 This technique can cause complications and is 
often not done today. One complication is that such a program will 
not run on a "back-up" computer in the event that the licensee's com­
puter fails to function. 
Another technological means for thwarting piracy is a 
microprocessor chip which can be inserted in the computer to provide 
a deciphering function. The program itself is encrypted before being 
provided to the licensee, and the chip is designed to decipher the en­
crypted program. The encrypted program is useless without the 
chip.2s0 
None of these technological methods is foolproof, and each sim­
ply increases the difficulty, cost, or risk which a would-be pirate must 
incur. 
IX. CONTRACTING SUGGESTIONS 
A. Proprietary Suggestions 
The license generally is restricted to a single particular computer 
(identified in the agreement by serial number). If use on more than 
one computer is desired, the additional computers are treated as call­
ing for additional licenses (often at reduced royalties). One exception 
commonly found in licenses is that in the event the identified computer 
fails to function properly, use may be made on a "back-up" computer. 
Limiting use to a single comp.uter is regarded as an important method 
of limiting improper proliferation. 
The license will specify the form of the program to be provided to 
the licensee. Generally, the source code form is more valuable to the 
licensee, and may be priced higher and be subject to more restrictions. 
If source code is provided, flow charts and listings may also be pro­
vided. Alternatively, a licensor may transfer only the object code 
form, accompanied by as little documentation as possible. 
Much of the agreement should deal explicitly with the protection 
of proprietary rights. The licensee may acknowledge the licensor's 
ownership of intangible property in the program, be it trade secrets, 
248. While the program is running on the computer, it can"read" this serial number. 
249. This serial number can be written into each licensed programming device by the 
licensor. 
250. For one such chip, see U.S. Patent No. 4,168,396. 
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confidential information, patent rights, or copyrights. Where trade se­
cret material is involved, the agreement should explicitly establish a 
confidential relationship, and may specify that all tangible materials 
transferred to the licensee remain the licensor's property. The licensee 
should be obligated not to engage in any use, transfer, or disclosure of 
licensed materials and information except as expressly set forth in the 
agreement. He should further be obligated to inform his employees 
and agents who may come into contact with the materials of their 
confidential nature, and should agree to take reasonable precautions to 
prevent any unauthorized use, transfer, or disclosure and, failing this, 
to report all such instances to the licensor. The licensee should also 
agree to cooperate with the licensor in the event of any litigation con­
cerning the matter. 
The specific uses to which the licensee may put the transferred 
material should be set forth. In particular, the matter of how much 
and what type of copying (if any) is to be permitted, should be ex­
pressly set forth. The licensee may be obligated to keep records of his 
copying, and even to number his copies. Of great importance is that 
each copy bear the appropriate notice, be it a notice that an algorithm 
is patented, that a program is copyrighted, or of a proprietary interest. 
All notices on programs should be present in human-readable form on 
the programming device, and in machine-readable form at the begin­
ning and end of the program (and perhaps at certain intermediate 
locations). 
Most licenses do not permit sublicensing, but where it is permit­
ted (as when the licensee is a service bureau operating, for lease on a 
time-sharing basis, a computer and numerous programs for use on it), 
the licensee must agree to impose restrictions on his sublicensees if 
there is any way the latter can obtain access to the program code. 
When a program is licensed in source code, the licensee may 
make modifications (unless prevented by the agreement). Accord­
ingly, it is well for the agreement to state what the parties' rights will 
be to those modifications. The licensee should also agree that on ter­
mination of the license, the licensed program will be deleted from any 
modification. 
Finally, the agreement should set forth the disposition of all li­
censed materials and copies thereof at termination of the agreement. 
Return to the licensor may be best, but most licenses provide in the 
alternative for destruction and certification thereof. Further, any con­
fidentiality provision should survive the agreement. 
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B. Other Provisions 
The duration of a license agreement may be perpetual, or may be 
a fixed term. If enhancements are included, the agreement should 
probably be for a fixed term so as to accommodate changes in licensing 
policy. 
The licensing fee is often payable as a single lump sum. The pro­
grams licensed should be identified (perhaps on an appended sched­
ule), and there may be provision for adding programs in the future. It 
should be made clear whether the license for the stated fee includes 
maintenance, enhancements, training, and any modifications necessary 
to fit the licensee's system. Most program licenses are non-exclusive 
(otherwise the parties would probably agree to a sale), and most licen­
sors prefer them to be non-transferable so that they have some knowl­
edge as to who has their program, and who is supposed to be paying 
for its use. 
A typical agreement also attempts to resolve the issue of liability 
in the event of program malfunction (e.g., limited to fee paid; includ­
ing indirect and consequential damages) and discusses warranty mat­
ters (e.g., "as is" without warranty; disclaimer of warranty of 
merchantability or fitness; warranty only of conformity to printed 
specifications; warranty acknowledging use). The answer to the ques­
tion of whether a particular warranty limitation is enforceable will 
often depend on the particular state in question. The agreement may 
also include a provision concerning indemnification (including legal 
expenses) for patent or copyright infringement or trade secret/confi­
dential information misappropriation. 
Generally, the licensee may terminate at will, and the licensor 
may terminate for cause (e.g., breach of agreement, including breach 
of confidence or failure to pay fees; or indications of bankruptcy). 
Other matters which may be dealt with in the agreement are responsi­
bility for any applicable taxes, choice of law, and an integration 
clause.2s1 
X. SUGGESTED LICENSOR PROCEDURES 
The licensor should take certain steps to see that its proprietary 
interests are not compromised. If it seeks patent protection, it must 
proceed in timely fashion. If it relies on copyright, it must be careful 
251. Because of the frequency with which misunderstandings seem to permeate com­
puter-related (and specifically software-related) transactions, attempts to introduce parol 
evidence at trial are quite common. 
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to place its copyright notice appropriately.2s2 In the case of trade se­
cret protection, he should mark all programs and documentation with 
appropriate legends, and maintain good internal security predicated 
on distribution on a "need to know" basis, employee confidentiality 
agreements, notice to employees as to what materials are confidential, 
and in some cases even secured (guards, fences, etc.) premises. Most 
importantly, this must all be part of a program, so that the existence of 
re~lar procedures can be established in the event of litigation. 
In the event of copyright or trade secret protection it may be 
Jtelpful to introduce into each licensed program a "house mark" con­
sisting of a few trivial and non-functional instructions whose only pur­
pose is to indicate the licensor as the source of the program. The same 
house mark may be used in all programs, or each package shipped 
Play contain a different one in an attempt to trace any "leak." 
In policing against infringement or misappropriation, the licensor 
will generally find it difficult to identify the instances where a pirate 
Uses the program unlawfully. However, occasional piracy by use only 
will generally not inflict severe economic harm. Significant injury 
would result where a pirate attempts to market the program in compe­
tition with its rightful proprietor. In that situation, however, the un­
lawful conduct is much more likely to come to the proprietor's 
attention. If the proprietor has carefully preserved its rights, it may be 
able to persuade or compel the pirate to cease and desist, and to rem­
edy any injury. 
252. For the statute, and Copyright Office rules, on affixation and positioning of 
copyright notice on programs, see 17 U.S.C. §401 (1976); 37 C.F.R. §§201.20, 202.2 (1984). 
